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This thesis examines contagion in networks in two settings: narratives infection in social
networks and default contagion in financial networks. In the first chapter, we consider the
choice of a politician of the timing of disclosure of a narrative, to maximise its adoption at a
given deadline. Voters update their opinions following a variation of the average-based De
Groot learning concept. With a certain probability a voter adopts an alternative narrative,
and the politician faces a trade-off between early and late disclosure. We find the optimal
timing of disclosure for disconnected and connected voters in certain networks. Finally, we
consider the impact of homophily on timing of disclosure and explore comparative statics.
Chapter two presents a model of default in financial networks where the decision by
one agent on whether or not to default impacts the incentives of other agents to escape
default. Agents' payoffs are determined by the clearing mechanism introduced by the
seminal contribution of Eisenberg and Noe (2001). We first show the existence of a Nash
equilibrium of this default game. Next, we develop an algorithm to find all Nash equilibria
that relies on the financial network structure. Finally, we explore some policy implications
to achieve efficient coordination.
In the last chapter, we extend the model of exposure of financial institutions through
liabilities linkages introduced by Eisenberg and Noe (2001), and we explore a second chan-
nel of exposure through credit lines or promised payments. While the liabilities create
direct risk of default, credit lines can cause the default of their potential receivers. We
prove the existence of a unique payment equilibrium and establish a fictitious default al-
gorithm that computes the payment equilibrium and the chain of defaults. Finally, we
investigate approaches to mitigate risks through multilateral netting and central clearing
and by targeting banks with cash injections.
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Introduction
Individual and institutional interactions impact several economic and social phenomena
that range from learning, opinion formation, technology adoption, spread of diseases and
epidemics up to trade of goods and services and financial risks. Being interconnected,
agents and entities influence and get influenced by each other continuously and repeatedly
in many different ways. In this context, the study of social and economic networks, which
relies on graph theory, has been an instructive method to investigate the diffusion of
ideas, information and risks through links and connections. In this thesis, we study two
frameworks of economic networks and investigate contagion among different agents and
institutions: the diffusion of narratives in social networks, and the contagion of the risk of
default in financial networks.
Narrative adoption and strategic timing of disclosure
Chapter 1 investigates narrative adoption and opinion formation in social networks. A
politician strategically chooses the timing to disclose a narrative in order to maximise its
adoption by voters at an exogenously given deadline  for instance, an election. After
disclosure, a voter can be influenced, with some probability, by an alternative narrative
opposing the politician's. A voter updates his opinion by repeatedly averaging the politi-
cian's narrative, the alternative narrative and his neighbours' beliefs, as well as his own
beliefs, in a De Groot learning manner. We determine the optimal timing of disclosure
for the cases of one voter and a group of voters. We also examine connections among
voters over symmetric networks. We consider two types of voters  supporters who are not
influenced by the alternative narrative, and non-supporters, who switch their attention
from the politician to the alternative narrative with a strictly positive probability. We
show that as the number of supporters increases, the optimal number of learning periods
(that is equivalently the length of the learning phase) increases, and the optimal timing of
disclosure is earlier. Next, we study the impact of homophily: the phenomenon of having
agents more connected to agents of their own type. We find that with higher homophily,
the narrative adoption of the supporter is higher and that of the non-supporter is lower.
1
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Moreover, we show that the optimal number of learning periods increases with the weight
that the politician assigns to the supporter's opinion. Conversely, the optimal number
of learning periods decreases with the probability of rejecting the politician's narrative.
We conclude by illustrating our findings in a particular symmetric network  which is the
circle.
Default and coordination in financial networks
In Chapter 2, we introduce strategic interactions in financial networks and consider a
default coordination game. We model a financial system where agents are linked to each
other through liabilities, and where the decision of a given agent on defaulting (or not) is
affected by the corresponding decisions of other agents. As a result of complementarities
and interdependencies of payments, the setting will generate a coordination game. The
liabilities repayments are determined following the model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the default game, and we
show that the multiplicity of equilibria, which is a general feature of coordination games,
is connected in our setting to the presence of cyclical obligations. Next, we establish an
algorithm that computes all Nash equilibria, based on the network structure. An important
issue that arises in coordination games is inefficient coordination, which results in our
setting in a suboptimal number of agents defaulting. We define the best equilibrium as the
Nash equilibrium with the smallest number of defaults. In this regard, we investigate the
introduction of a central clearing counterparty as a policy to reach efficient coordination
and the implementation of the best equilibrium.
Credit lines contagion in financial networks
Systemic risk, or the extent of contagion via domino effect and its impact on financial
stability, has been the subject of ongoing interest given its significant spillover effects
on the entire economy, generating long periods of low growth rates, unemployment and
excessive levels of accumulated debts. In Chapter 3, we consider a financial system in which
banks are connected via two exposure channels: liabilities, which are the obligations they
owe to each other; and credit lines which take the form of payments they have promised
to make in the future, or the debt they have promised to issue. We assume that liabilities
and credit lines under consideration, have the same maturity date, and we examine the
risk of default of different institutions. We extend the approach introduced by the seminal
work of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and use a fixed-point argument to prove the existence of
a unique payment equilibrium. Afterwards, we present an algorithm that can compute the
2
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payment equilibrium and the possible chains of defaults. We also consider possible policy
implications in order to mitigate the risk of default. One way is multilateral netting, which
can be achieved through a central clearing counterparty that operates in the credit lines
network or in the liabilities network or in both. A second approach is the intervention
of a regulator and cash injections to particular banks in order to increase the interbank
payments across the financial system.
3
Chapter 1
Narrative adoption and strategic
timing of disclosure
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1.1 Introduction
How do people form their opinions and how can communication strategies affect public
opinion? These questions have been important for policymakers in choosing how to dis-
close their policies, marketing managers in deciding when to advertise a new product and
researchers in understanding learning dynamics, along with many other contexts.
In politics, the choice of adequate communication and persuasion strategies has always
been a key issue. Furthermore, the interest in narratives, stories and fake news has spiked
in recent years, especially with the role that social media outlets have been playing in
channelling them. In this chapter, we consider a model of adoption of narratives with naive
average-based learning in an electoral framework. A group of non-strategic agents, voters,
tend to adopt a narrative proposed by a strategic politician. Starting with a benchmark of
one politician and one voter, the results are later generalised to a large number of voters.
Understandably, this setting is not limited to an election or a political framework and can
rather be applied to a variety of frameworks where one or more agents try to convey their
opinion to a group of people or to persuade the group of people to believe something or
take a certain action. The results can be naturally generalised to any context with an
influencer and followers, an instructor and learners, and many similar situations where one
agent is conveying a story or an idea to a group of individuals.
The main novelty in our model is that it explores learning while focusing on the timing in
a finite framework. Often, in many real-life situations, there is a deadline for the opinion
formation process, and the public opinion matters most at a particular point in time. For
instance, opinions regarding political issues generally matter most at the time of an election
from the politician's point of view. Broadly, the aim is to focus on two aspects. First,
the communication strategies of politicians ahead of an election are not always based
on promoting well-defined policies. Instead, there is evidence that electoral campaigns
can revolve around advancing a certain opinion, narrative or story. Second, most of the
opinion formation models focus on infinite learning processes and look at the convergence of
opinions. However, in practice, there is a time horizon a deadline determined exogenously
by several possible factors. An election is one example.
We study a setting in finite time where a given politician has a certain fixed opinion or
story that he aims to convey to the voters, by a deadline that is for instance the date
of an election. Nevertheless, after the politician's announcement of his opinion, the voter
can replace the announcement with an alternative opinion, and abandon the politician's.
In particular, we investigate the case where with some positive probability, the voter can
abandon, disbelieve or move away from the narrative. This is similar to epidemics mod-
5
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els, which generally model susceptible agents who can be infected with a certain positive
probability, and recover afterwards with a positive probability. Here, we allow for partial
infection. In other words, a voter can accept the narrative only partially. Consequently,
the politician encounters a trade-off: disclosing his narrative early and bringing the voter
closer, or disclosing later to avoid the narrative being replaced by the alternative.
We also explore social interactions through a network of voters. Networks have been
studied and applied to different concepts in economics. Furthermore, it has been well
established that the network structure and the distribution of social ties affect the opinion
formation process. Individuals are influenced by their neighbours, peers, families and
friends in various decisions they make in their life, from what they consume to their political
inclination and opinions regarding specific issues. Here, a given individual learns about
the narrative not only from the sender or the source of the narrative (who, in our model, is
the politician), but also from friends, family, neighbours and colleagues  in other words,
people who form his social network. We investigate how narrative adoption can be affected
by their social network, and how this will impact the average opinion at the end of the
learning process, and consequently the disclosure strategy of the politician.
1.1.1 Discussion: assumptions and motivation
Narratives There exist several definitions for narratives, which essentially agree that
a narrative is a story that is told, but differ on the purposes for which that story is
told and how it is presented. For instance, Bruner (1991) discusses how narratives not
only represent, but also construct reality. In his paper on narrative economics, Shiller
(2017) defines a narrative as a simple story, which explains events that are brought up
in conversation between people and on news and social media. Furthermore, in his book
(2019), he adds that a story may also be a song, joke, theory, explanation, or plan that
has emotional resonance and that can easily be conveyed in casual conversation. On the
other hand, Benabou, Falk and Tirole (2018) describe narratives as arguments that people
share to justify moral actions. Here, we use a generic definition: a narrative is a story, an
idea or an argument used to explain facts, which can be but is not necessarily true, and
which people discuss and might fully or partially adopt or reject.
It is discussed that narratives in societies date back to centuries ago. They have im-
pacted the way people have thought about various phenomena throughout history, and
they have also been present in economics as well as in sociology, history, political science
and many other fields. In economics, for instance, they were widely used to provide reas-
ons for economic crises from the Great Depression up until the recent European debt crisis.
6
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Epidemics of narratives As suggested by Shiller (2017), the contagion of narratives
can be approached using an epidemics model, in particular the seminal work by Kermack-
McKendrick (1927), which introduced the SIR model, whereby they split a given population
into three categories: susceptibles, infected and recovered. In our model, we start with
a population of susceptible individuals at the time of disclosure of the narrative, where
each individual becomes infected with some probability. Infection here means including
the narrative in part of the individual's opinion of the next period. In other words, an
individual can be partially infected by the narrative. Thereupon, the individual recovers
with a positive probability, replacing the politician's narrative with another one, or with
his initial opinion. When plotting the opinion of an individual over time, we observe that
it will have a bell shape similar to the shape of the curve of the number of infected and
contagious over time, in an epidemic, increasing then decreasing.
Average-based naive learning Social interaction generally comprises repeated sharing
of ideas, information and opinions among connected individuals who form complex net-
works. That is mainly why the setting adopted in this chapter has the sense of the De
Groot naive learning model based on imitation and repeated averaging of beliefs of neigh-
bours. Golub and Jackson (2010) study when agents using simple updating rules, such as
De Groot updating, correctly aggregate information and reach the true state of the world,
in a similar way to the fully rational learning processes.
Jadbabaie, Molavi, Sandroni and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012) investigate a model where indi-
viduals communicate with their neighbours about a certain parameter via a simple updat-
ing rule and show that they aggregate information correctly if they consider their personal
signals in a Bayesian way. Molavi, Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2018) provide behavioural
foundations for non-Bayesian models of learning on social networks.
Types of voters A voter can be characterised by several features: his initial opinion, his
network connections and weights on his neighbours, his attention and the weight he places
on the politician, i.e. the probability of accepting the narrative of the politician, and the
probability of recovery of the narrative. Notably, the attention can be regarded as the trust
a given voter has in the politician's narrative or in the alternative narrative. Consequently,
with some probability, the voter switches his attention, and replaces the politician's opinion
with an alternative one. We consider the case where the alternative narrative is equivalent
to the initial opinion of the voter. With this assumption, the probability of replacing the
politician's narrative would represent the probability of rejecting the politician's narrative
and moving back to the initial opinion.
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Types of politicians Politicians can have different objectives, which in turn determine
their strategy and choices when campaigning and addressing the people. A politician who
worships an ideology and principles has naturally a different objective from a politician who
cares about winning an election or reaching office. While the former focuses on citizens and
voters who adopt or have a tendency to adopt the same political principles, who are known
as core voters, the latter directs his attention and action towards swing or median
voters, who are less politically inclined. These are two extreme examples of politicians:
ideology-motivated versus office-motivated. Nevertheless, in real life, politicians have both
objectives and care about winning elections as well as having their principles adopted, but
not equally. We look at different types of politicians and explore how the objective of the
politician affects the timing of disclosure and the narrative adoption.
Homophily Individuals are generally inclined to associate and connect with others of
similar types, whether that is in relation to their profession, age, gender, race, religion
or any other characteristic. This favouritism towards similar individuals is known as ho-
mophily, and it is a common feature of social networks. With the emergence of social
media outlets, homophily has become more observable and measurable and the interest
in studying it has increased accordingly. Halberstam and Knight (2016) use data on con-
nections between Twitter users and find that they are exposed to like-minded information
disproportionately.
1.1.2 Results
First, we examine a benchmark model with one politician and only one voter. The voter
updates his opinion in discrete time periods, by splitting his attention between his own
opinion and an external opinion. This external opinion is the politician's narrative at the
time of disclosure, but can be replaced after disclosure with an alternative narrative with
some positive probability. The deadline T ∈ N+, which can be for instance an election, is
equivalently the maximal number of learning periods. The politician's main objective is
to choose a strategy that guarantees the voter's opinion at time T to be the closest to her
proposed narrative.
We determine an optimal strategy for the timing of disclosure of the narrative, which is a
function of the voter's attention to the politician and of the probability of replacing the
narrative of the politician. We extend the setting to include more voters, and we find the
optimal time of disclosure for the case of n disconnected voters, and for special networks
such as networks with symmetric connections, the circle and the complete network. We
also explore the existence of different types of voters (supporters and non-supporters), and
8
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the impact of homophily on the dynamics of opinions.
We examine the case of a balanced network, which we define as a network represented by
a double-stochastic matrix. We show that in this case if the politician targets the average
opinion and weights the voters equally, the network has no effect on the optimal timing
of disclosure. Moreover, we show that as the number of supporters increases, the average
opinion and the optimal number of learning periods increase.
One main result is relating networks with symmetric structures, where we consider a
network of two groups of voters, connected with an equal number of links to voters of the
same type and with an equal number of links to voters of the other type. We show that
when the politician targets the weighted average opinion, the belief of a supporter increases
with a higher level of homophily, while that of a non-supporter decreases. Furthermore, the
weighted average opinion increases with the weight assigned to supporters, and decreases
with the probability of a non-supporter replacing the politician's narrative. Consequently,
if the politician assigns a larger weight to the supporters' opinions, the optimal number of
learning periods increases as homophily increases, and the politician's strategy would be
to disclose earlier.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 is dedicated to the literature review.
We present the model and investigate the one voter benchmark in Section 1.3. We study
the settings with n disconnected and connected voters in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 and Section
1.6. Iterations and computations of opinions are gathered in Appendix A, while proofs are
in Appendix B.
1.2 Related literature
The chapter builds mainly on two strands of literature: narratives and average-based
learning in networks.
Narratives have become a topic of interest in several fields of study. Shiller (2017) in-
vestigates how economic fluctuations are affected by narrative epidemics, in contrast to
imperatives. He shows how several major economic events were considered to be the result
of popular narratives at different times. He suggests that many narratives are either based
on false ideas or have no factual basis, yet still propagate widely. Moreover, he suggests
that the prominent model introduced by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) and known as
the SIR model, which divides a population into susceptibles, infected and recovered in-
dividuals, can be applied to the contagion of narratives: an infected individual, who is
convinced by a narrative, can infect a susceptible individual, who in turn would be infected
after being exposed to a certain number of other infected individuals. While adopting a
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somewhat different definition for narratives than the one we present here, Benabou, Falk
and Tirole (2018) study narratives as justifications for moral behaviour.
We introduce here a model of average-based learning of networks. The seminal paper
by De Groot (1974) provided a foundation for average-based learning. He established a
model where a group of individuals, each having a certain probability distribution, interact
to estimate some parameter. His main result was providing conditions for convergence to
a consensus among agents. This model has been examined, developed and extended by a
large number of research papers, which applied it to different settings and frameworks.
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) introduce a phenomenon in opinion formation that
they call persuasion bias and define as the failure of individuals to consider repeated
information that they receive. They investigate two implications of persuasion bias: social
influence, which is the importance of connections in communication networks in shaping
group opinions; and unidimensional opinions, where they show that in the case of a set
of issues, individuals' opinions converge to one opinion on the left-right spectrum. They
also present some empirical applications. Golub and Jackson (2007) study networks with
homophily and the dynamics of learning in a model where agents use simple updating rules
such as De Groot updating. They show that agents correctly aggregate information and
reach the true state of the world, in a similar way to the fully rational learning processes.
They also identify networks where beliefs fail to converge to the rational limit. Acemoglu
and Ozdaglar (2011) discuss the literature on opinion dynamics in networks. Golub and
Jackson (2012) study average-based learning in networks characterised by homophily. They
explore learning dynamics and measure speed of convergence to a consensus and how it
relates to the degree of homophily in the network.
Jadbabaie, Molavi and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018) provide behavioural foundations for non-
Bayesian models of learning on social networks.
Grabisch et al. (2018) investigate a model with two strategic agents aiming to influence
non-strategic agents who update their options following De Groot learning. Each strategic
agent's strategy consists of forming a link with one non-strategic agent in order to alter
the average opinion. They provide a characterisation of the equilibrium that underlines
influenceability of targets and their centrality, and they also introduce a new centrality
measure. Moreover, they show that in the case of strategic agents with similar impact,
the equilibria are symmetric. Rusinowska and Taalaibekova (2019) extend this model and
introduce a third centrist persuader. They discuss the effect of the centrist persuader on
the consensus and equilibria.
Finally, we also investigate timing in finite learning. In this regard, there are few papers
that have focused on the timing in opinion formation. Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin (2018)
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study release of information of a sender about her private type and show that in equilibrium
a bad sender releases later than a good sender. They also find empirical evidence to their
prediction using data from U.S. presidential elections and timing of scandals.
1.3 Benchmark: one Voter
1.3.1 Two narratives
Define a setting with a politician (she) and a voter (he). Let xP be the politician's narrative
and x0 the initial opinion of the voter such that xP and x0 belong to R+, and assuming
xP is sufficiently larger than x0. We call td the time of disclosure of the narrative  that is,
the decision variable of the politician. On the other hand, the number of learning periods
k  that is, the difference between the date of the election T and the time of disclosure td is
the length of the learning process: k := T − td. Consequently, the problem of determining
the optimal timing of disclosure td is equivalent to determining the length of the opinion
formation process k.
The expected belief of the voter at a given time t is x(t), and for all t ≤ td it is assumed
to be equal to the initial opinion x0. This belief will correspond to the level of adoption or
acceptance of the narrative by the voter. At the time of disclosure, the voter observes the
narrative and weighs it in his opinion by splitting his attention between the narrative of
the politician and his own opinion (from the previous period) respectively, such that (1−θ)
is the weight he assigns to the politician's narrative. After that, with a probability (1−p),
the voter rejects the narrative and adopts instead an alternative narrative xC in R+ while
keeping the same weight (1 − θ) on the new narrative, which can be identical to, or less
than, x0 (for now xC ≤ x0). The main assumption in this setting is that the two narratives
are not symmetrically weighted in the opinion updating rule the voter is following. Once a
voter turns his attention (1−θ) towards the alternative narrative instead of the politician's,
he never looks back and updates with the alternative as the only external source.
The decision of the politician regarding the optimal time of disclosure corresponds therefore
to the optimal length of the opinion formation process, and more precisely the number of
learning periods. Let x(k) denote the expectation of the opinion of the voter at td + k,
k periods after the time of disclosure td. The politician's objective is to determine the
optimal number of periods k. The law of motion of the voter's opinion1 over three learning
1In the case of a standard De Groot updating, where a voter observes both narratives and updates
accordingly, weighting p(1−θ) and (1−p)(1−θ) as the politician's and the alternative narrative respectively,
the updating rule will be such that x(k) = p(1 − θ)xP + (1 − p)(1 − θ)xC + θx(k − 1) = (1 − θk)(pxP +
(1− p)xC) + θkx0 which converges to pxP + (1− p)xC as k goes to infinity.
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(1− θ)xP + θx0
(1− θ)xC + θx(1) (1− θ)xP + θx(1)
(1− θ)xC + θx(2) (1− θ)xC + θx(2) (1− θ)xP + θx(2)
1− p p
1− p p
Figure 1.3.1: Learning process over three periods
periods is illustrated in Figure 1.3.1 and can be formally (shown in Appendix A) written
for k ≥ 2, as
x (k) = (1− pk−1)(1− θ)xC + pk−1(1− θ)xP + θx (k − 1) (1.3.1)
Assuming θ 6= p and following a series of iterations, it can be rewritten as a function of
the parameters θ, p, xCand xP :
x (k) =
(
1− θk−1 − p
k−1 − θk−1




p− θ (1− θ)x
P + θkx0
Lemma 1.1. As the number of learning periods k goes to infinity, the expected opinion of
the voter converges to the alternative narrative xC with strictly positive (1 − p). In other
words, if the politician discloses very early, before the election, the voter will adopt the
alternative narrative, if he has a positive probability of replacing the politician's narrative.
Proof. The proof of this lemma as well as all other proofs will be provided in Appendix
B.
The updating rule stated in equation 1.3.1 is an averaging rule where coefficients sum
up to one, and where some of them are time-dependent. The weights the voter assigns
to the politician's narrative and to the alternative narrative change with the number of
learning periods. More specifically, if p is strictly less than one, meaning that with some
strictly positive probability the voter will switch to xC , or in other words the voter assigns
a strictly positive weight to the alternative narrative, then as k increases, the weight on
xC increases and the weight on xP decreases. Subsequently, the voter's opinion converges
to xC .
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1.3.2 Absence of alternative narrative: standard De Groot updating
Here we suppose that the politician is the only source of influence and the probability
of abandoning the narrative (1 − p) is equal to zero. This setting is equivalent to the
regular average-based model by De Groot, with two agents (politician and voter), where
the politician strategically observes only her opinion xP and thus her opinion is fixed, while
the voter updates by averaging between xP weighting (1−θ) and his own opinion weighting
θ. The opinion updating rule can be amended2 as x(k) = (1 − θ)xP + θx(k − 1). Using




l(1− θ)xP + θkx0 = (1− θk)xP + θkx0. A similar convergence result to the
one in the standard De Groot is present here. More precisely, we show that in this case, it
is optimal for the politician to disclose her narrative as early as possible to maximise its
adoption by the voter.
By considering the limit when k goes to infinity, the voter's opinion converges to the
politician's narrative xP : limk→∞
[
(1− θk)xP + θkx0] = xP . On the other hand, if we
suppose that the initial opinion is x0 = 0 and xp is sufficiently large, the politician's
objective will be to maximise x(k) =
(
1− θk)xP .
Lemma 1.2. When the probability of replacing the politician's narrative is null, it is op-
timal for the politician to disclose as early as possible to maximise the voter's narrative
adoption.
Proof. See Appendix B.
1.3.3 Narrative adoption
In what follows, we assume that, after disclosure, instead of adopting an alternative nar-
rative with a certain probability, the voter abandons the politician's narrative and moves
back to his initial opinion x0 with a positive probability. More precisely, one period after
disclosure, with a probability (1−p), the voter rejects the narrative and moves back closer
to his initial opinion. This is slightly similar to the SIR epidemics (Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered) models, where the voter gets infected by the narrative with probability (1−θ),
and then recovers afterwards with probability (1− p), in a De Groot learning setting. In
other words, the opinion of a given voter, after k learning periods, depicts the degree to
which the voter is infected by the narrative of the politician, and how close his opinion is
to xP . This can be formally written, as shown in Appendix A:




2Noting here that the coefficients in the updating rule are not time-varying.
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Next, and for the remainder of the chapter, we assume that the initial opinion is equal to
0. The problem of the politician can be reduced thereafter to maximising the expectation
of the voter's belief after k periods from disclosure, as follows:
max
k
x (k) = (pk − θk)1− θ
p− θx
P
Figure 1.3.2: Opinion as a function of learning periods in the case of one voter, with
θ = 0.55 and p = 0.7
Proposition 1.1. For p 6= θ and 0 < θ, p < 1, the optimal number of learning periods that









Proof. See Appendix B.
We examine now how the optimal number of learning periods k in the benchmark case
of one voter changes with the level of attention to the politician (1 − θ), and with the
change of probability of narrative rejection (1 − p). To this end, we check the sign of the
derivatives of k with respect to θ and p. The sign of these derivatives will dictate how k
changes as θ or p increase. Conversely, k will change in the opposite direction as (1 − θ)
or (1− p) increase.
Proposition 1.2. (Comparative Statics) For θ 6= p, the optimal number of learning periods
k increases with p and with θ. Equivalently, k decreases with the probability of rejecting
the narrative (1− p) and with the attention to the politician (1− θ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
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Non-zero initial opinion We examine here the case where there is an alternative nar-
rative xS = 0 that is different from the initial opinion x0 6= 0. Here, the voter's initial
opinion is between the alternative narrative (from the left) and the politician's narrative.
The opinion updating process becomes:
x (k) = (pk − θk)1− θ
p− θx
P + θkx0
xC = 0 x0 xP
Corollary 1.1. For p 6= θ and 0 < θ, p < 1, for a sufficiently large narrative xP , alternative
zero narrative xC = 0 and a non-zero initial opinion x0 6= 0, the optimal number of learning













Comparing the optimal timing of disclosure between the case where the alternative
narrative is the initial opinion and the case where they are different, we get kcx0 6=0 ≥ kcx0=0
whenever θ > p. This is true whenever 1 − θ < 1 − p, meaning that the weight assigned
to the narrative (first the politician's and then the alternative narrative with probability
1− p) must be smaller than the probability of replacing the politician's narrative.
1.4 Case of n disconnected voters
We generalise the setting to N = {1, 2, ..., n} voters with θi, voter i's attention to his
opinion and his neighbours' opinions if he is part of a network , (1− pi) the probability
of rejecting the politician's narrative and x0i , i's initial opinion. The politician's objective
remains maximising the adoption of her narrative by the voters. We consider two possible
objective functions for the politician. One is the average opinion x¯(k) :=
∑
i xi(k)
n , k periods
after disclosure, which assumes that she values the opinions of all voters equally. Another
possibility is a weighted average opinion x˜(k) :=
∑
i aixi(k) where ai ∈ [0, 1] is the weight
the politician assigns to the opinion of voter i, such that
∑
i ai = 1.
In what follows, we will adopt a simplifying assumption that attention levels are
identical among voters such that θi = θ and pi = p for all i ∈ N . We will also look
at a particular setting with two types of voters: supporters and non-supporters.
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Definition 1.1. A voter is a supporter if his probability of rejecting the politician's nar-
rative is null such that pi = 1. He is a non-supporters if he rejects the politician's narrative
with a strictly positive probability and has pi = p strictly less than one.
We define accordingly the sets of supporters and non-supporters as S = {i ∈ N | pi = 1}
and N \ S = {i ∈ N | pi = p < 1} respectively, with s = |S|. The main advantage of
these assumptions is that they will allow us to have a tractable and solvable model, and
to achieve some comparative statics.
In this section we investigate the case where voters are disconnected and do not influence
each other's opinions, whereas in the section after we examine networks of voters.
1.4.1 Different initial opinions
We consider here a case of voters with distinct initial opinions x0i , all strictly positive,
while there is an alternative narrative xC = 0 and xP is assumed to be sufficiently large,
as before. Given that the n voters do not interact nor influence each other's opinions, the
opinion of each voter i at k periods after disclosure is given by
xi(k) = (p
k − θk)1− θ
p− θx
P + θkx0i (1.4.1)
Given that the influence of the politician and that of the alternative narrative over the
voters are identical through θ and p, this setting shows that voters follow a similar opinion
updating rule but start from different initial positions.






Supposing that the politician targets the average opinion x¯(k), we determine the optimal
time of disclosure that will be a function of θ, p, xP and the average initial opinion x¯0. The
approach and the result are similar to the case of one voter with an initial opinion different
from zero (as in Corollary 1.1), with the average initial opinion instead of the voter's initial
opinion.
Lemma 1.3. In the case of n disconnected voters with different initial opinions, the optimal














Proof. See Appendix B.













P +θkx˜0. Following a similar reasoning to the case where the politician targets the
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which is a function of x˜0. The result is also similar to the one voter framework in Corollary
1.1.
1.4.2 Same initial opinions, different types
Here we look at the case where the alternative narrative is identical to the voter's initial
opinion xC = x0i = 0 for every i ∈ N . Assuming all voters have the same attention to their
own opinion θ, the opinions after k learning periods of a supporter and a non-supporter
respectively will be :
xs (k) = (1− θk)xP
xm (k) = (p
k − θk)1− θ
p− θx
P
(a) Politician targets average opinion In the general case where voters have beliefs
xi(k), attention θ and probability pi, the updating rule for each voter is given by
xi(k) = p
k−1
i (1− θ)xP + θxi(k − 1)







(1− θ)xP + θx¯(k − 1) (1.4.2)
In case of two types of voters, the politician's problem becomes to choose k that max-
imises x¯(k) = snxs(k) +
n−s
n xm(k).




(1− θk)xP + n− s
n
pk − θk
p− θ (1− θ)x
P (1.4.3)
Lemma 1.4. In the case of n disconnected voters of two different types, supporters and
non-supporters, all with initial opinions at 0, if the politician maximises the average opin-













(b) Politician targets weighted average opinion Assuming voters are of two types,
the politician's objective is to maximise x˜(k) = axs(k) + (1− a)xm(k).
Lemma 1.5. In the case of n disconnected voters of two different types, supporters and
non-supporters, all with initial opinions at 0, if the politician maximises the weighted av-
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Proof. See Appendix B.
1.5 Case of n connected voters
We suppose now that the voters are connected, and we define γij ∈ [0; 1] as the weight
i assigns to j's opinion such that
∑
j∈N γij = 1.γij is equally the influence of voter j's
opinion on voter i's opinion. We assume that the network is exogenous and time-invariant,
with Γ the corresponding n× n adjacency matrix.
Given x0i the initial opinion of i, x
P the politician's narrative and xC the alternative
narrative, the updating rule of opinions can be written for k ≥ 1 as
xi(k) = x




(see Appendix A). Figure 1.5.1 illustrates the learning process of an individual i over three
periods.
More generally, this can be written in matrix notation:
x(k) = (I−Θ)(1− p(k−1))xC + (I−Θ)p(k−1)xP + ΘΓx(k − 1) (1.5.1)
where x(k) is the vector of opinions k periods after disclosure, Θ is the diagonal matrix
with entries Θii = θi∀i, I is the identity matrix, 1 is the vector with all elements equal to












(1− θi)xC + θi
∑
j γijxj(1) (1− θi)xP + θi
∑
j γijxj(1)
(1− θi)xC + θi
∑
j γijxj(2) (1− θi)xC + θi
∑





Figure 1.5.1: Learning process over three periods in the case of n connected voters
Grabisch et al. (2018) investigate a framework where the weights do not vary with time,
and they prove that the opinions converge to a certain steady state that they determine.
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M(k−1) is the augmented updating matrix and is row-stochastic, time-varying and of size
(n + 2) × (n + 2). Let the augmented opinion vector be the opinion vector including the







noting that xP and xC are fixed over time and not updated. The augmented updating rule
can be written as:
X(k) = M(k−1)X(k − 1)
X(k) = M(k−1)M(k−2)X(k − 2) = M(k−1)M(k−2)...M(1)X(1)
= Πk−1l=0 M
(l)X(0)
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) study a similar framework, and define the influence






. They prove that if the adja-
cency matrix of the network is strongly connected and assuming that the time-dependent
weights (common to all agents) sum up to infinity, beliefs converge to a consensus. These
conditions do not apply to our setting here for two main reasons. First, the adjacency
matrix is not strongly connected, since the politician and the source of the alternative
narrative are isolated and have fixed opinions. Second, the time-varying weights ( pk−1i for
every i) are different for different voters.
We define an n×2 matrix Λ(k−1) whose columns are the two vectors α(k−1) and β(k−1);
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Λ(k−1) + ΘΓΛ(k−2 (ΘΓ)2

Moreover, the product Πk−1l=0 M













We show next that if the learning process has no time limit and no deadline, the beliefs
of the voters converge eventually.
Proposition 1.3. As the number of learning periods k goes to infinity, the beliefs of the
voters converge.
Proof. See Appendix B.













In what follows, we consider specific well-behaved networks with two groups of voters
S and N \S , in cases where the politician targets the average opinion x¯(k) or the weighted
average opinion x˜(k) = axs(k) + (1− a)xm(k).
1.5.1 Balanced network
We suppose that the alternative narrative and the initial opinions of the voters are such as
xC = x0 = 0, and that the voters have the same level of attention θ but different pi's. We
define below a specific type of network, which we call a balanced network, as a directed
network where the sum of weights assigned to every agent by the others is equal to 1. The
corresponding adjacency matrix will be column-stochastic with the sum of the entries of
every column of the equal to 1, as well as row-stochastic. Several networks with symmetries
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have this property, such as the complete network and the circle, which we will investigate
later on.
Definition 1.2. A balanced network is one that is described by an adjacency matrix that





i∈N γij = 1.
We show below that for this simple type of network, if the politician targets the average
opinion, then her problem in this case is identical to the case where voters are disconnected.
Proposition 1.4. If the network is balanced, the optimal time of disclosure that maximises
the average opinion is identical to the case of a disconnected setting where the network is not
present; in other words, the network has no role in shaping the average narrative adoption.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1.4 implies that x¯(k) in case of a balanced network will be as stated in equation
1.4.2 .
For tractability, we consider again the case of two types of voters  supporters in S ⊂ N
whose pi = 1, and non-supporters in N \ S ⊂ N who reject the narrative with a positive





(1− θk)xP + n− s
n
pk − θk
p− θ (1− θ)x
P
Consequently, the optimal number of learning periods that maximises narrative adoption













Next, we examine how k varies as the number of supporters increases. Intuitively,
given that supporters do not replace the politician's narrative with an alternative one,
their level of adopting it, and consequently their opinion, should be higher than that of
a non-supporter. Moreover, the trade-off the politician faces in regard to the timing of
disclosure can be associated with the types of voters: supporters drive early disclosure and
a longer learning period, while non-supporters push in the opposite direction given that
they might replace xP . A higher number of supporters implies a higher impact of the
supporters' opinions on the weighted average opinion and dictates an earlier disclosure.
Proposition 1.5. In a balanced network with s supporters and n− s non-supporters, the
optimal number of learning periods increases with the number of supporters.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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1.5.2 Complete network
A complete network is a network where every node is connected to every other node. In
particular, Jackson (2010) defines the complete network as one where all possible links
are present between different nodes.
Given here that our model includes the self-loop, we consider a slight variation of the
complete network which allows the voter to update including his own opinion. Each voter
updates his opinion by averaging opinions of the other n− 1 voters and his own. We look
at an undirected unweighted graph, such that the degree of each voter will be equal to n




i (1− θ)xP +
θ
∑
j∈N xj(k − 1)
n
which is equivalent to
xi(k) = p
k−1
i (1− θ)xP + θx¯(k − 1) (1.5.3)
The opinion of each individual at a time t is therefore a function of the average opinion of
the network in the previous period.


















+ θx¯(k − 1)














pi − θ (1− θ)x
P








pki ln p− θk ln θ
pi − θ (1− θ)x
P = 0
which is a transcendental3 equation that does not have a closed-form solution but can be
solved numerically. Instead, if we consider the case of two types of voters defined above,
3A transcendental equation is an equation that contains a transcendental function that cannot be
analytically expressed using algebraic operations; such as the logarithmic and exponential functions and
the trigonometric functions (see Chapter 11 in Bashirov (2014)).
22
Narrative adoption and strategic timing of disclosure










































1− θ + (n− s)










































Given that the complete network is a balanced network as per definition 1.2, the result
obtained here is identical to the optimal timing of disclosure reached in the case of balanced
network.
(b) Politician targets weighted average opinion Consider the complete network
with the same two types of voters defined above, such that every voter is linked to every
other voter, and the updating rule follows equation 1.5.3. The politician targets the





(1− θ)xP + θx¯(k − 1).















4x˜(k) = axs + (1 − a)xm = (a + (1 − a)pk−1)(1 − θ)xP +
θ
n
[asxs(k − 1) + a(n− s)xm(k − 1) + (1− a)sxs(k − 1) + (1− a)(n− s)xm(k − 1)]
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1.5.3 Networks with symmetric structures
We examine in this section a symmetric network with two groups, representing each type
of voter. Letting Ni be the set of neighbours of i and di = |Ni| the degree of i, we define
an equitable partition as follows.
Definition 1.3. An equitable partition (see Powers and Sulaiman (1982)) is a partition of
a set N composed of non-empty and pairwise disjoint groups G1, ..., GH such that H ≥ 2,
and if any i and j belong to the same group Gh then |Ni ∩Gl| = |Nj ∩Gl| ∀l = 1, ...,H.
In such networks, agents will all have a similar number of links to agents of similar type, and
a similar number of links to agents of different types. We consider here an equitable parti-
tion of N , formed of two groups S and N \ S, supporters and non-supporters respectively,
such that a given voter has q links (including himself) with the same type, and r links with
the other type. Equivalently, for i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S, we have |Ni ∩ S| = |Nj ∩ (N \ S)| = q
and |Ni ∩ (N \ S)| = |Nj ∩ S| = r. It follows that each voter i will have a degree di = q+r.
Further, assuming the network is undirected and unweighted, the weight a given voter puts
on each of her neighbours is 1q+r . Say Gi is the group a voter i belongs to and G−i is the
other group; the opinion updating rule of a voter of group i is:
xi(k) = p
k−1
i (1− θ)xP +
θ
q + r
[qxi(k − 1) + rx−i(k − 1)]
where xi(t) and x−i(t) are the opinions of a voter of group i and a voter of the other group
−i respectively.
Specifically, the beliefs of a supporter and of a non-supporter, xs(k) and xm(k) respectively,
are given by:
xs(k) = (1− θ)xP + θq
q + r




k−1(1− θ)xP + θq
q + r
xm(k − 1) + θr
q + r
xs(k − 1)
A network where voters have more links with voters of his own type than with voters
of the other type, exhibits homophily and has q > r. Homophily is generally defined as the
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tendency of individuals to connect more to individuals of their own type, which can be their
age, race, gender, profession, political preferences, etc. In this context, homophily is the
tendency of supporters to connect more and assign more weight to their fellow supporters
rather than non-supporters, and vice versa. Define ρ := qr as the ratio of links within the
same type over links across types; ρ will depict homophily in the network. A network with
homophily has therefore q > r and ρ > 1. This modifies the updating processes5 such that
xs(k) = (1− θ)xP + θρ
ρ+ 1
xs(k − 1) + θ
ρ+ 1
xm(k − 1) (1.5.6)
xm(k) = p
k−1(1− θ)xP + θρ
ρ+ 1
xm(k − 1) + θ
ρ+ 1
xs(k − 1) (1.5.7)
(a) Politician targets average opinion Assuming the two groups are of the same







(1− θ)xP + θxs(k − 1) + xm(k − 1)
2
The network here will be a balanced network, and if the politician maximises the average
















An illustration of a network with equitable partition with two types of voters is in Figure
1.5.2. In Figure 1.5.2a, each voter has q = 3 links to the same type (including the self-loop)
and r = 1 link to a voter of another type, while in figure 1.5.2b, q = 3 and r = 2. There is
higher homophily in the network (a) on the left, and there are more inter-type connections
in the network (b) on the right.
(a) Case of ρ = 3 (b) Case of ρ = 32
Figure 1.5.2: Network with equitable partition with n = 6 and s = 3
5q = ρr and q + r = q(ρ+1)
ρ
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(b) Politician targets weighted average opinion We look here at the case of a
population split equally between groups of individuals of two types, represented by a
network with equitable partition. The opinions of a supporter or a non-supporter are
given respectively by equations 1.5.6 and 1.5.7.
The weighted average can be written as
x˜(k) = C0 + C1p





















The first-order condition is given by:
∂x˜(k)
∂k
= 0 = C1p










This equation is transcendental and has no closed form solution for k which can be de-
termined numerically.
In what follows, we examine the change of x˜(k) with the degree of homophily ρ. First,
we show that the opinion of a supporter xs(k) is larger than the opinion of a non-supporter
xm(k). In particular, the two opinions are equal for k = 0 and 1, whereas for any k > 1,
xs(k) is strictly greater than xm(k).
Proposition 1.6. For a given level of homophily ρ, the belief (adoption of the narrative)
is higher for a supporter than for a non-supporter: xs(k) ≥ xm(k).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1.7. In a network with equitable partition where voters are equally split
between supporters and non-supporters, the belief of a supporter (non-supporter) increases
(decreases) with homophily ρ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1.7 reveals that an increase in the level of homophily has opposite effects
on the opinions of supporters and non-supporters; the former increases while the latter de-
creases. This will have direct implications for the politician's strategy regarding the timing
of disclosure, which depends on the weight she assigns to each type. This is investigated
further in Proposition 1.8.
Proposition 1.8. (Comparative Statics) The weighted average opinion x˜(k) increases as
the weight the politician places on the supporters' opinion increases, and as the probability of
a non-supporter replacing the narrative decreases. Consequently, in both cases, the optimal
number of learning periods k∗ increases, and the timing of disclosure is earlier.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1.9. (Convergence) As k goes to infinity, the opinions of a supporter and a




Proof. See Appendix B.
Notably, when considering the opinions of supporters and non-supporters as the number
of learning periods k goes to infinity, we conclude that they converge to different beliefs,
and no consensus is reached. The limiting level of narrative adoption of the supporter is
always higher than that of a supporter. Furthermore, the belief of the supporter is smaller
than xP in contrast to the case where he does not communicate with non-supporters.
Illustration We consider an illustration of a network with equitable partition of support-
ers and non-supporters. We suppose that the parameters are given by xP = 9, θ = 0.8, 0.9
and p = 0.9, 0.7. In each figure, we plot the weighted average opinion x˜(k) with respect to
the number of learning periods k, for two levels of homophily ρ = 8 and ρ = 0.5. Figures
1.5.3 and 1.5.5 illustrate the case of a politician who assigns more weight to supporters
such that a = 0.9; while Figures 1.5.4 and 1.5.6 illustrate the case of a politician who
assigns more weight to non-supporters such that a = 0.1. As predicted by Propositions
1.7 and 1.8, the weighted average opinion with more weight on the supporters' opinion
(a = 0.9), is higher for higher homophily ρ = 0.8; whereas when more weight is assigned
to non-supporters, the weighted average opinion is lower for higher homophily.
Figure 1.5.3: Weighted average opinion over time with θ = 0.8, p = 0.9 and a = 0.9
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Figure 1.5.4: Weighted average opinion over time with θ = 0.8, p = 0.9 and a = 0.1
Figure 1.5.5: Weighted average opinion over time with θ = 0.9, p = 0.7 and a = 0.9
Extreme types of politicians: ideology versus office motivated We consider here
two specific types of politicians with extreme motivations and objectives. Whether a
politician cares about the ideology of her supporters or about the beliefs of the entire
population will dictate her objective function and consequently her choice of timing of
disclosure. Assume here that voters update their opinions following equations 1.5.6 and
1.5.7 in a similar way to the case of two unequal groups. The two objective functions of
the politician considered here are the weighted average opinions with two possible extreme
weights: a = 1, assigning all the weight to the opinion of the supporters; and a = 0,
assigning all the weight to the opinion of the non-supporters.
In the first case, a politician, who is solely motivated by ideology, aims to convey her
narrative and maximise its adoption by a subgroup of supporters. Formally, the politician
maximises x˜(k) at a = 1: maxk x˜(k)ca=1 = xs(k).
In contrast to the ideology-motivated politician, an office-motivated politician cares about
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Figure 1.5.6: Weighted average opinion over time with θ = 0.9, p = 0.7 and a = 0.1
winning an election by getting the maximum possible adoption of her narrative by all of the
population. In particular, we assume that this type of politician considers that supporters
will choose her for office in any situation, and consequently targets only the non-supporters.
Here, the politician maximises x˜(k) at a = 0: maxk x˜(k)ca=0 = xm(k).
Proposition 1.8 shows that with a higher a, the weighted average opinion increases and so
does the optimal number of learning periods k, while the timing of disclosure is earlier.
Therefore, we can notice that these two types of politicians represent the two opposing
extremes. The ideology-motivated politician with a = 1 will have the earliest optimal
timing of disclosure, while the office-motivated politician will have the latest.
1.5.4 Circle
A circle is a network that is formed of one cycle, such that every node has two neighbours.
In order to include the self-loop, we consider a variation of the standard circle network
where n voters are placed on an undirected unweighted circle, such that each is connected
to three voters (two neighbours and a self-loop), as illustrated in figure 1.5.7. A formal
definition of the circle is given by the n× n adjacency matrix
Γ =

1 1 0 ... 0 1
1 1 1 0 ... 0







... ... 1 1 1
1 0 ... 0 1 1

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Figure 1.5.7: Undirected unweighted circle
(a) Politician targets average opinion Starting with the initial condition xi(td) = 0
and xi(1) = (1 − θ)xP for every i ∈ N , we can write the average opinion in the circle
(Appendix A) as












In this unweighted circle, every voter listens to three other voters and influences three other
voters as well. Hence, it is a balanced network as per definition 1.2. The optimal timing of











(b) Politician targets weighted average opinion A circle network with an even
number of nodes is a specific network where each voter has three links: the self-loop and
two others. It would be a network with equitable partition if we assume that the two types
of voters behave symmetrically and have the same size; each has two links (including his)
to the same type q = 2 and one to the other type r = 1 (case A), or the other way around
q = 1 and r = 2 (case B), as in Figure 1.5.8. Consequently we compare between ρ = 2 and
ρ = 12 .
Case A ρ = 2 When the network is characterised with homophily then ρ = 2 (Figure
1.5.8a)  that is, the weight on one's own type is double that on the other type, the opinions
of a supporter and of a non-supporter are given by
xs(k) = (1− θ)xP + 2θ
3




k−1(1− θ)xP + 2θ
3














(b) Case B: ρ = 12
Figure 1.5.8: Two types of circle network
The weighted average opinion can be written as (Appendix A)
x˜(k) = (1− θ)xP
[
C0 + C1p































k ln p− C2θk−1 ln θ
This is a transcendental equation that can be solved numerically.
Case B ρ = 12 This case represents a circle where each voter is connected to two other
voters of opposite type, which results in only one-third of the weight being assigned to his
own opinion and type (figure 1.5.8b). It is an illustration of non-homophily. The opinions
of supporters and non-supporters are
xs(k) = (1− θ)xP + θ
3




k−1(1− θ)xP + θ
3
xm(k − 1) + 2θ
3
xs(k − 1)
The weighted average opinion can be written as
x˜(k) = (1− θ)xP
[
C0 + C1p




















The first-order condition is given by
∂x˜(k)
∂k









k ln p− C2θk−1 ln θ
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How does time of disclosure change with homophily in the circle? In order to
determine how the optimal number of periods k changes with the degree of homophily ρ,
we start by looking at how xs(k) and xm(k) change with ρ.
Let ∆xs(k) := xs(k)cρ=2 − xs(k)cρ= 1
2
and ∆xm(k) = xm(k)cρ=2 − xm(k)cρ= 1
2
.
Proposition 1.10. In the circle, the opinion of a supporter (non-supporter) k periods
after disclosure xs(k) (xm(k)) is higher (lower) for a degree of homophily ρ = 2 than for
ρ = 12 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
We show next that if the politician is ideology-motivated and cares about the support-
ers, for higher ρ = 2, it is optimal to disclose earlier than for ρ = 12 . If, on the other hand,
he is office-motivated and cares only about the non-supporters, it is optimal to disclose
later for higher ρ.
Proposition 1.11. In the circle, the number of periods that maximises the belief of a
supporter xs(k) is higher when for degree of homophily ρ = 2 than for ρ = 12 . Conversely,
k that maximises the belief of a non-supporter xm(k) is lower for ρ = 2 than for ρ = 12 .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 1.2. In the case of a circle, a politician whose objective is to maximise x˜(k)
discloses earlier (later) for higher homophily ρ = 2 than for ρ = 12 if he puts more weight
on the supporter a > 12 (non-supporter 1− a > 12).
Proof. See Appendix B.
1.5.5 Two unequal groups
We investigate here the case of two groups of voters (supporters and non-supporters) that
are of different sizes. Assuming that voters update their opinions following equations 1.5.6
and 1.5.7, the politician's problem changes according to s, n− s the number of each type
of voters.
(a) Politician targets average opinion The average opinion here can be defined as:
x¯(k) = sxs(k)+(n−s)xm(k)n . Substituting for xs(k) and xm(k), we get: x¯(k) =
s+(n−s)pk−1
n (1−
θ)xP + θρ+1(ρs+ n− s)xs(k − 1) + θρ+1(s+ ρ(n− s))xm(k − 1).
(b) Politician targets weighted average opinion Consider a network of voters who
belong to two distinct groups of different sizes, supporters and non-supporters. As before,
we assume that every voter i has q links with voters of the same type and r of those of a
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different type, and that the degree of homophily is ρ = qr . The opinions of the voters will
update following equations (1.5.6) and (1.5.7). If the politician's objective is to maximise
the weighted average opinion, the weight on the opinion of the supporter a ∈ [0; 1] will
represent the weight on the group of supporters, and the same will apply for the non-
supporters. Accordingly, if s is the number of supporters, define σs as the weight that the
politician puts on the opinion of each supporter such that σs =
a
s . For the n − s non-
supporters, the weight the politician puts on each of them will be σm defined as σm =
1−a
n−s .
Note that it holds that sσs + (n − s)σm = 1, and consequently, σm can be written as
σm =
1−σss
n−s . The weighted average opinion is therefore
x˜(k) = sσsxs(k) + (n− s)σmxm(k)
An evident implication6 is the effect of the group sizes and weights on x˜(k) and con-
sequently on the optimal timing of disclosure k
∗
. The latter will increase (decrease) with
the number of supporters s (non-supporters n− s), and it will increase (decrease) with the
σs (σm).
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a model of narrative adoption in an election setting where
voters update following a variation of De Groot average-based learning. The voters, who
have a certain initial opinion, split their attention between their network and a narrative
proposed by a politician, which they replace later on, with some probability, with an
alternative narrative or with their initial opinion. The objective of the politician, the
strategic agent in this model, is to maximise the adoption of this narrative at a given,
exogenous, time limit or deadline, which we assume here to be an election. For this
purpose, the politician chooses strategically the optimal timing to disclose her narrative.
We suppose that the politician either targets the average opinion, viewing all the voters
as equal, or targets a weighted average opinion, assigning different weights to different
voters or types of voters. We solve this problem for a benchmark with one voter, n
disconnected voters and n voters connected over networks with particular structures.
We also investigate homophily and its effects on opinions and timing of disclosure. In
the case of two types of voters  supporters who do not reject the politician's narrative, and
non-supporters who do with a positive probability  such that the two types are equally
sized with symmetric connections (the case of a network with equitable partition), the belief
6Taking the derivatives w.r.t. s and σs:
∂x˜(k)
∂s
= σsxs(k) − 1−sσs−1+nσsn−s xm(k) =
σs (xs(k − 1)− xm(k − 1)) ≥ 0; ∂x˜(k)∂σs = s (xs(k − 1)− xm(k − 1)) ≥ 0.
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of a supporter increases with homophily, whereas the belief of a non-supporter decreases.
Furthermore, the optimal timing of disclosure is earlier and the weighted average opinion
increases as the weight that the politician assigns to the opinion of supporters increases
and as the probability of a non-supporter replacing the narrative decreases.
This setting can be extended to more general and inclusive situations. One possibility
is considering other types of voters, notably voters who oppose the politician and update
their opinions without paying any attention to her. However, a voter of this type can
still be exposed to the politician's narrative indirectly through his neighbours, which will
consequently affect the politician's strategy. Another extension is the presence of other
strategic politicians, advocating different narratives. In political competition, as well as in
marketing competition and other influence situations, a considerable number of strategic
agents compete in order to convince and to gain the support of non-strategic agents. Adding
more strategic agents to our approach would constitute an interesting aspect to consider





Opinion of one voter in presence of an alternative narrative xC
The initial opinion of the voter at the time of disclosure of the narrative is given by
x(0) = x0, it evolves such that
x (1) = (1− θ)xP + θx0
x (2) = (1− p) [(1− θ)xC + θx (1)]+ p [(1− θ)xP + θx (1)]
= (1− p)(1− θ)xC + p(1− θ)xP + θx(1)





pl(1− p)(1− θ)xC + pk−1(1− θ)xP + θx (k − 1)
= (1− θ)xC + pk−1(1− θ)(xP − xC) + θx (k − 1)







θlpk−1−l(1− θ)(xP − xC) + θkx0
Solving for the geometric series we get
x (k) =
(
1− θk−1 − p
k−1 − θk−1




p− θ (1− θ)x
P + θkx0
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Opinion of one voter in the case of narrative infection
x(0) = x0
x (1) = (1− θ)xP + θx0
x (2) = (1− p) [(1− θ)x0 + θx (td + 1)]+ p [(1− θ)xP + θx (1)]




pl(1− p)(1− θ)x0 + pk−1(1− θ)xP + θx (k − 1)
= (1− θ)x0 + pk−1(1− θ)(xP − x0) + θx (k − 1)
Computing recursively as above:
x (k) = (1− θk)x0 + (pk − θk)1− θ
p− θ
(
xP − x0)+ θkx0








xi (1) = θix




xi (2) = p




















Networks with symmetric structures, x˜(k)
The weighted average opinion of n voters is given by





(1− θ)xP + θ
ρ+ 1
[(aρ+ 1− a)xs(k − 1) + (a+ ρ(1− a))xm(k − 1)]
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(1− θ)xP + θ
ρ+ 1
[2x¯(k − 1) + (ρ− 1)x˜(k − 1)]
















































































= C0 + C1p





where C0, C1 and C2 are constants, independent of k.




























(1− θ)xP + 1
3










































x¯(k − l − 1)
7(aρ+ 1− a)xs(k − 1) + (a+ ρ(1− a))xm(k − 1) = (aρ − a)xs(k − 1) + (a − aρ)xm(k − 1) + xs(k −
1) + ρxm(k − 1) + xm(k − 1)− xm(k − 1) = a(ρ− 1)xs(k − 1) + (1− a)(ρ− 1)xm(k − 1) + 2x¯(k).
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where C0, C1 and C2 are constants that depend on the parameters of the model.








































(1− θ)xP + θ
3



















x¯(k − 1− l)












































































































































































1− θk−1 − p
k−1 − θk−1




p− θ (1− θ)x
P + θkx0 = xC
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Proof of Lemma 1.2
The first order condition of the politician's maximisation problem is as follows:
−θk ln θxP = 0 ⇐⇒ θk = 0
This holds when k goes to infinity.
Proof of Proposition 1.1
The first order condition is:
(pk ln p− θk ln θ)1− θ
p− θx














k is well-defined for p 6= θ and 0 < θ, p < 1. We show below that k will always be positive.
We take the second order condition to verify that this is a maximum:
∂2x(k)
∂k2
= (pk(ln p)2 − θk(ln θ)2)1− θ
p− θx
P
for which the sign is the sign of
pk(ln p)2 − θk(ln θ)2
p− θ
Finding the roots:
pk(ln p)2 − θk(ln θ)2





ln2 p− ln2 θ
]










2 p− ln2 θ
]
p− θ =
θk [ln θ(ln p− ln θ)]
p− θ = 0
This is not defined at p = θ and is negative elsewhere since:
if p > θ:p− θ > 0; ln p > ln θ and ln θ < 0.
if p < θ:p− θ < 0; ln p < ln θ and ln θ < 0.
Sign of k
• For θ > p then:ln (pθ) and ln [ ln θln p] > 0 =⇒ k > 0.
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• For θ < p then: ln (pθ) and ln [ ln θln p] < 0 =⇒ k > 0
Proof of Proposition 1.2
First, derivative of k with respect to θ and p will give an opposite sign to the derivative of














and similarly for the derivative with respect to p.










































−1 + ln θ
ln p
− ln ln θ
ln p
)
The function −1 + ln θln p − ln ln θln p has the form of the transcendental equation x − 1 − lnx
whose minimum is at x = 1 and is equal to 0. Therefore this function is non-negative and
∂k
∂p > 0 for p 6= θ. Consequently, ∂k∂(1−p) < 0.


































ln θ − 1− ln ln pln θ
)
Similarly to the above, the function ln pln θ − 1 − ln ln pln θ is a transcendental equation of the
form x− 1− lnx. Thus, ∂k∂θ > 0 for p 6= θ and ∂k∂(1−θ) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1.1
First order condition:
(pk ln p− θk ln θ)1− θ
p− θx


















































The second derivative is given by ∂
2x(k)
∂k2
= (pk(ln p)2−θk(ln θ)2)1−θp−θxP +θk(ln θ)2x0, which






(ln p− ln θ) using the first order condition that gives(p
θ
)k







• If p > θ then 1−θp−θ > 1 ⇐⇒ 1−θp−θxP − x0 > xP − x0 > 0 and ln p − ln θ > 0 while
ln θ < 0.
• If p < θ then 1−θp−θxP < 0 ⇐⇒ 1−θp−θxP − x0 < 0 , ln p− ln θ < 0 and ln θ < 0.
Therefore for any p 6= θ, the second derivative is negative and k is a maximum.
Proof of Lemma 1.3











(pk − θk)1−θp−θxP + θkx¯0. The first order condition is:
∂x¯(k)
∂k
= (pk ln p− θk ln θ)1− θ
p− θx
P + θk ln θx¯0 = 0























pk(ln p)2 − θk(ln θ)2
) 1− θ
p− θx
P + θk(ln θ)2x¯0
By substituting from the first order condition for pk ln p, we get






(ln p− ln θ)
which is negative since for p > θ, ln p− ln θ > 0 and 1− p < 1− θ =⇒ p− θ < 1− θ and
1−θ
p−θx
P − x¯0 > 0. While for p < θ, 1−θp−θxP < 0 and ln p− ln θ < 0. Hence, k is a maximum.
Proof of Lemma 1.4






(1− θk)xP + n− s
n
pk − θk
p− θ (1− θ)x
P
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⇐⇒ pk ln p =
(
s(p− θ)





























> 0, and equivalently n(1− θ)− s(1− p) > 0.














k (ln θ)2 xP





from the first order condition, we get
∂2x¯(k)
∂k2










(ln p− ln θ)
This can be simplified into
θk ln θxP
n





(n(1− θ)− s(1− p)) (ln p− ln θ)
p− θ
Clearly, (ln p−ln θ)p−θ is positive for any p and θ; and
θk ln θxP
n < 0 due to ln θ. The second
derivative is therefore negative since n(1 − θ) − s(1 − p) > 0 for existence, and k is a
maximum.
Proof of Lemma 1.5
The first order condition is given by
∂x˜(k)
∂k











(1− a)(1− θ) + 1
)
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This exists whenever a(p−θ)(1−a)(1−θ) + 1 > 0, which holds for 1− θ − a(1− p) > 0.
The second derivative is
∂2x˜(k)
∂k2
= −aθk(ln θ)2xP + (1− a)
(




substituting for pk ln p from the first order condition we get
= θk ln θxP
[
−a ln θ + ln p
(
a+ (1− a)1− θ
p− θ
)]
= θk ln θxP
ln p− ln θ
p− θ (1− θ − (1− p)a)
which is negative whenever k exists. Hence, k is a maximum.






First, we show that (ΘΓ)k−1 is convergent. By definition, the adjacency matrix of
the voters network is row-stochastic. We define θmax as the highest θi across all voters:
θmax := max {θi, i = 1, 2, ..., n}. This implies that ΘΓ ≤ θΓ.
The spectrum of ΘΓ is the set of its eigenvalues, call it spec(ΘΓ). Its spectral radius
is defined by ρ(ΘΓ) := max{|λ| : λ ∈ spec(ΘΓ)}. Given that Γ is row-stochastic, then
ρ(Γ) = 1 and ρ(ΘΓ) ≤ θρ(Γ) = θ < 1 (see Meyer (2000)). This implies that (ΘΓ)k−1







lΛ(k−1−l). This can be written as
Λ(k−1) + (ΘΓ) Λ(k−2) + ...+ (ΘΓ)k−2Λ(1) + (ΘΓ)k−1Λ(0)
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=

(1− θ1) pk−11 (1− θ1)(1− pk−11 )
...
(1− θn) pk−1n (1− θn)(1− pk−1n )
 ≤

(1− θ1) (1− θ1)
...
(1− θn) (1− θn)

which holds for any k. Let ϕ :=

(1− θ1) (1− θ1)
...
(1− θn) (1− θn)
, then we can write
Λ(k−1) + (ΘΓ) Λ(k−2) + ...+ (ΘΓ)k−1Λ(0) ≤
[
I + (ΘΓ) + ...+ (ΘΓ)k−1
]
ϕ
As k goes to infinity, the right-hand side converges to (I−ΘΓ)−1 ϕ. This implies that :
k−1∑
l=0












Proof of Proposition 1.4
To show that the average opinion after k learning periods does not depend on the network,






xi(k) where xi(k) = p
k−1
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Since Γ is column stochastic
∑


















(1− θ)xP + θx¯(k − 1)
which does not depend on γij and is identical to the average opinion when voters are
disconnected.
Proof of Proposition 1.5















is always negative since if θ > p, pθ < 1 and ln
p
θ < 0, while if θ < p, θ − p < 0 and





= −sign (s(1− p)− n(1− θ)).
s(1− p)− n(1− θ) < 0 ⇐⇒ n− s− nθ + sp > 0
which is the condition of existence for k in the balanced network. Therefore, it always
holds that ∂k∂s > 0.
Conversely, if this condition does not hold, x¯(k) is increasing and the earliest disclosure
is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
We consider the difference between the belief of a supporter and that of a non-supporter
xs(k)− xm(k) =
(1− pk−1)(1− θ)xP + θ(ρ− 1)
ρ+ 1
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Define x and y such that x := θ(ρ−1)ρ+1 and y :=
θ(ρ−1)
p(ρ+1) . We notice that p =
x
y and we


































































Comparing every two consecutive terms, we notice that their sum is positive:
1− pk−1 > 1− pk−2 and 1 > θ(ρ− 1)
ρ+ 1
∀ρ















in the last term will have a positive power k− 2 (since in the first term it has
power 0), therefore it is also positive. Hence xs(k)− xm(k) > 0 for any ρ.
Proof of Proposition 1.7
First, we present the following Lemma that we will use to complete the proof of Proposition
1.7.
Lemma 1.6. The changes of beliefs of a supporter and a non-supporter with the level of
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Now, we can show using the mean value theorem that, for two functions f(.) and g(.)
continuous at x0 and x1 such that x0 < x1 and f(x0) ≥ g(x0), then f ′(x) > g′(x) if and
only if f(x1) > g(x1). Suppose here that xs(k) = f(ρ) and xm(k) = g(ρ).
First, at ρ = 0, f(0) = (1− θ)xP + θxm(k− 1) and g(0) = pk−1(1− θ)xP + θxs(k− 1),
we can show that f(0) > g(0):
f(0)− g(0) = (1− θ)x
P
(
p− pk + (1− p)(−θ)k + θ(1− pk))
(1 + θ)(p+ θ)
This is positive since: if k is even, all terms are positive; while when k is odd p− pk +
(1− p)(−θ)k + θ(1− pk) = p(1− pk−1)− θk + pθk + θ− θpk = p(1− pk−1) + θ(1− θk−1) +
θp(θk−1 − pk−1) which is positive since p(1− pk−1) > θp(θk−1 − pk−1).
Since we have shown that f(ρ) > g(ρ), then ∂f(ρ)∂ρ >
∂g(ρ)
∂ρ .
However we have shown that ∂f(ρ)∂ρ +
∂g(ρ)
∂ρ = 0. This leads to
∂f(ρ)
∂ρ − ∂g(ρ)∂ρ = 2∂f(ρ)∂ρ >
0 =⇒ ∂f(ρ)∂ρ > 0 and ∂g(ρ)∂ρ < 0. Therefore ∂xs(k)∂ρ + ∂xm(k)∂ρ = 0 , ∂xs(k)∂ρ > 0 and ∂xm(k)∂ρ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.8




which is weakly positive.
Second, in order to find how the weighted average opinion changes with p, we check



































(1− θ)xP (θρ+ 2p(1 + ρ)
1 + ρ
> 0
Assuming it holds for k − 1, then ∂xs(k)∂p and ∂xm(k)∂p are both positive, implying that x˜(k)
is positive as well.
8For k = 2, ∂xs(3)
∂p
= 0 and ∂xm(3)
∂p
= xP (1− θ) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.9











limk→+∞ xm(k) = θ1+θ+ρ(1−θ)x
P 9
limk→∞ x˜(k) = a limk→+∞ xs(k) + (1− a) limk→+∞ xm(k) = a(1+ρ(1−θ)−θ)+θ1+θ+ρ(1−θ)
Proof of Proposition 1.10
First, in order to complete this proof, we prove the following lemma which applies to any
network with equitable partition.
Lemma 1.7. The changes of beliefs of a supporter and a non-supporter between two levels
of homophily ρ1 > ρ2 are such that ∆xs(k) + ∆xm(k) = 0.
Proof. This can be done by induction. First, it is assumed that xs(0) = xm(0) = 0;
this implies that xs(1) = xm(1) = (1 − θ)xP . At k = 2, xs(2) = (1 + θ)(1 − θ)xP and
xm(2) = (p+ θ)(1− θ)xP . Thus, for k = 0, 1, 2, the homophily parameter does not appear
and ∆xs(k) = ∆xm(k) = 0. For k = 3, homophily has a role in the beliefs and we have:
xs(3) = (1 + θ





2 + θ2)(1− θ)xP + θ1 + ρp
ρ+ 1
(1− θ)xP
For ρ1 > ρ2,




− ρ2 + p
ρ2 + 1
)
= θ(1− θ)xP (1− p)(ρ1 − ρ2)
(ρ1 + 1)(ρ2 + 1)
= −θ(1− θ)xP (1− p)(ρ2 − ρ1)
(ρ1 + 1)(ρ2 + 1)
= −∆xm(3)
.







[ρ1xs(k − 1)cρ1 + xm(k − 1)cρ1]−
1
ρ2 + 1




[xs(k − 1)cρ1 + ρ1xm(k − 1)cρ1]−
1
ρ2 + 1
[xs(k − 1)cρ2 + ρ2xm(k − 1)cρ2]
}
9Both limits of xs(k) and xm(k) as k goes to infinity are bounded below by 0 and bounded above by
xP .
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= θ [∆xs(k − 1) + ∆xm(k − 1)] = 0
Next, We prove ∆xs(k) > 0, then given that ∆xm(k) = −∆xs(k) we can deduce that
∆xm(k) < 0 .
This is done by induction. For k = 0, 1, 2, ∆xs(k) = 0.
For k = 3, ∆xs(3) = θ
2+p







(1− θ)xP = 13(1− p)θ(1− θ)xP > 0.
For k = 4, ∆xs(4) =
1
3(1− p2)θ(1− θ)xP > 0.
We assume that it is true for k− 1 and k, and ∆xs(k− 1),∆xs(k) > 0. Want to show that
it holds for k + 1.
From the definition of xs(k) we can write,

















as per the assumption above. This is equivalent to xs(k − 1)cρ=2 − xm(k − 1)cρ= 1
2
> 0.











(1− pk)(1− θ)xP + θ
3
















(1− pk)(1− θ)xP + θ
3











Proof of Proposition 1.11
Using the mean value theorem, it can be shown that for two functions f(.) and g(.) con-
tinuous at x0 and x1 such that x0 < x1 and f(x0) ≥ g(x0), then f ′(x) > g′(x) if and
only if f(x1) > g(x1). Consider xs(k)cρ=2 = f(k) and xs(k)cρ=1 = g(k). We know that




∂k . This implies that when xs(k)cρ=1 is maximised, xs(k)cρ=2 will be
positive and will reach its maximum later at a higher k.
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Proof of Corollary 1.2
Let ∆x˜(k) = x˜(k)cρ=1 − x˜(k)cρ=2. We determine first how the sign of ∆x˜(k) changes and
then we look at the optimal k for each degree of homophily ρ.
∆x˜(k) = axs(k)cρ1 + (1− a)xm(k)cρ1 − axs(k)cρ2 − (1− a)xm(k)cρ2
= a∆xs(k) + (1− a)∆xm(k)
= (2a− 1)∆xs(k)
which is positive whenever a > 12 and negative for a <
1
2 . For k = 0, 1, 2, ∆x˜(k) = 0 since
∆xs(k) = 0, and for a >
1









Default and coordination in financial
networks
52
Default and coordination in financial networks
2.1 Introduction
Financial institutions carry out various transactions with each other, including risksharing
and insurance. The architecture of the network of transactions between institutions can
support financial stability because it enables them to share funding or transfer risk. But
these linkages can also facilitate the diffusion of shocks through the system, due to chains
of default and the domino effect. This is referred to as systemic risk. Systemic risk is
costly for individuals, institutions and economies, as demonstrated by the last financial
crisis. The obvious need for a stable financial system has led to a significant interest in
policies that could reduce systemic risk and mitigate contagion.
This paper introduces a model of default in financial networks. We study a two-period
economy where agents have a positive endowment in each period. The endowment rep-
resents agents' cash flows from outside the financial system. We assume that agents hold
each other's financial liabilities and that this constitutes the network between them. These
liabilities mature in the second period, and we assume that agents' second-period endow-
ments are small and deterministic, so that they face a risk of default. More specifically, the
liabilities structure results in cyclical payments interdependencies that are simultaneously
computed according to the clearing mechanism described in the seminal contribution of
Eisenberg and Noe (2001). The clearing vector satisfies three criteria:
• debt absolute priority, which stipulates that liabilities are paid in full in order to
have positive equity;
• limited liability, which means that the payment made by each agent cannot exceed
its inflows;
• equal seniority of all creditors, which implies pro rata repayments.
Agents can avoid default by storing part of their first-period endowment. Due to comple-
mentarities in the payments, the decision taken by one agent to store part of his endowment
exerts a positive externality on the other agents to whom he is connected.1 We show that
the strategic interactions in the financial system modelled here can be investigated as a
coordination game, called the default game, where agents' decisions are simply whether to
default or not. It is well known in the literature that coordination games will in general
yield multiple purestrategy Nash equilibria and that the set of purestrategy Nash equi-
libria has a lattice structure  in particular, there are two extreme purestrategy Nash
equilibria. In our setting, the best equilibrium is the one where the largest number of
1The non-storage in our model can be equivalently interpreted as a bank run in the influential Dia-
mondDybvig model.
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agents choose the maximal action Non-Default and the worst equilibrium is the one where
the largest number of agents choose the minimal action Default. In the paper, we relate the
multiplicity of Nash equilibria to the presence of a cycle of financial obligations. Then, we
develop a simple algorithm for finding all Nash equilibria of the default game. While there
are easy algorithms for finding the maximal and minimal equilibria and relatively easy
algorithms to compute all Nash equilibria in coordination games such as the default game
(see Echenique (2007)), the advantage of the algorithm developed in this paper is that
it relies on the financial network structure to inform the computation of Nash equilibria.
Algorithms that exploit the financial network structure such as the algorithm developed
in this paper, as well as quickly computing all Nash equilibria, provide useful information
on the strategic interactions between agents.
In this paper, we show that the problem of inefficient coordination may arise in fin-
ancial networks. Similar to other areas in economics, the strategic complementarities of
payments due to the cyclical financial interconnections allow for the existence of multiple
Nash equilibria. This gives rise to the question of which one of these equilibria will be
the outcome of the underlying default game. From a policy perspective, given that inef-
ficient coordination might pose a severe economic problem, there is a need for financial
institutions fostering efficient coordination of agents' decisions. Recently, central clearing
has become the cornerstone of policy reform in financial markets since it limits the scope
of default contagion. Our analysis shows that introducing a central clearing counterparty
(henceforth, CCP) also allows agents playing different actions at different Nash equilibria
to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium at no additional cost. As a consequence, our
result reinforces the key role CCP's play in stabilising financial markets.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we go over the related literature.
Then we describe the model and show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Section 2.3.
We develop an algorithm to find all Nash equilibria in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 provides
some policy implications of central clearing. Section 2.6 concludes the paper, followed by
an appendix devoted to the proofs.
2.2 Related Literature
The impact of the financial network structure on economic stability has been a subject
of ongoing interest since the last financial crisis (of 2008). The seminal contributions of
Allen and Gale (2000) and Eisenberg and Noe (2001) were first to acknowledge that the
financial network structure determines default contagion, and would serve as a basis for
many subsequent contributions.
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Allen and Gale (2000) investigate how symmetric financial networks lead to contagion,
where links represent sharing agreements. Their key finding is that incomplete financial
networks are less resilient and more vulnerable to contagion than their complete counter-
parts. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) develop a static model of default contagion in a financial
network where agents hold each other's financial liabilities and the activities and operations
of each agent are condensed into one value: the operational cash flow. The repayment of
liabilities will be interdependent, since whether an agent defaults or not is a result of his
operational cash flow as well as the payments he receives from other agents. Eisenberg and
Noe first prove the existence of a clearing payment vector that is unique under mild condi-
tions. They also provide an algorithm to compute the clearing vector, which is important
to predict chains of defaults.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) extend the Eisenberg and Noe model
to accommodate agent exposure to outside shocks. They establish that up to a certain
magnitude of shocks, the more connected the financial network is, the more stable it is;
beyond this threshold, the connectedness of the network makes it more prone to contagion
and thus more fragile. Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014) introduce two concepts of cross-
holdings that have distinctive and non-monotonic impact on default cascades. Integration,
which measures the dependence on counterparties, expands the extent of default contagion
but reduces the probability of the first failure; while diversification, which measures the
heterogeneity of cross-holdings, increases the propagation of failure cascades but decreases
the exposure level among pairs of financial institutions. Cabrales, Gottardi and Vega-
Redondo (2017) investigate the optimal network structure that maximizes risk-sharing
benefits among interconnected firms while decreasing their risk exposure. Other recent
contributions include Teteryatnikova (2014) and Csóka and Herings (2016).
Several approaches have been investigated to mitigate the domino effect in the financial
network, such as central clearing and identifying the most systemically relevant financial
institutions and then targeting them through cash injections. For instance, Demange
(2018), following a similar approach to Eisenberg and Noe (2001), develops a new measure,
called the threat index, which identifies the most systemically relevant agents for optimal
targeted cash injection.
2.3 The Model
Consider a two-period (t = 1, 2) economy with N = {1, 2, ..., n} agents. Agent i's endow-
ment in the first period is z1i ≥ 0 and in the second period is z2i > 0. The endowment of
agent i in each period denotes the cash flows arriving from outside the financial system.
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We assume that agents hold each other's liabilities, which mature in the second period.
More specifically, given two agents i, j ∈ N , let Lij ∈ R+ denote the liability that agent
i owes agent j. Then, agent i's total liabilities are Li =
∑
j∈N Lij . Meanwhile,
∑
j∈N Lji
is the total assets of agent i. Let α = (αij)i,j∈N denote the matrix of relative liabilities,
with entries αij =
Lij
Li
representing the ratio of the liability agent i owes to agent j over
the total amount of agent i's liabilities.




from his first-period endowment and
receives an interest rate r > 0 on his storage. Given the storage strategies of agents
x = (xi)i∈N , let pix = (pixi )i∈N denote the clearing payment vector, uniquely defined as in
Eisenberg and Noe (2001), such that for each agent i it holds that
pixi = min







This means that z1i − xi denotes the equity of agent i in the first period and






denotes the equity of agent i in the second period.








i , where e
1
i is the equity of agent i
at t = 1 and e2i is the equity of agent i at t = 2. Therefore, the utility function of agent i,
given the storage strategies of agents x = (xi, x−i), is
Ui(z
1










j − pixi .
2.4 Nash Equilibria of the Default Game
First, we investigate further the economy introduced above. Observe that each agent will
choose to store a positive amount of his first-period endowment if and only if he prefers
(is better off) not to default; otherwise he will store nothing. If he prefers not to default,
since his utility is linear and the interest rate r > 0 he will store his entire first-period
endowment. Similarly, it is only the decision of an agent to default or not, rather than the
amount of storage, that affects the other agents. This is because, if he defaults, he will pay
out his total second-period equity and, if he does not default, he will pay his total liability,
neither of which is directly affected by his level of storage.
Therefore, the strategic interaction of agents in the economy can be investigated as a
binary coordination game with two actions (Default) = 0 and (Non-Default) = 1 among
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which agents must choose. Now, define a threshold Ti (a−i) as the minimum amount agent
i must pay in the second period to avoid default, given other agents' actions a−i.
Proposition 2.1. The threshold Ti (a−i) is well-defined and decreasing in a−i.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2.1, together with all our other proofs, appears in the
Appendix.
Proposition 2.1 shows that the threshold Ti (a−i) is well-defined. Observe that agent i
will choose to play 1 whenever
(1 + r)z1i − Ti (a−i) ≥ z1i .
Therefore, the best reply function of agent i can be written as follows:
Ψi (a−i) =

1 if rz1i − Ti (a−i) ≥ 0
0 otherwise.





The default game introduced above corresponds to a binary game of strategic com-
plements. As defined in Topkis (1979) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985),
strategic complementarities arise if an increase in one agent's strategy increases the op-
timal strategies of the other agents.2
Theorem 2.1. There exists a purestrategy Nash equilibrium of the default game.
Theorem 2.1 shows the existence of a purestrategy Nash equilibrium. Understandably,
the existence of a purestrategy Nash equilibrium follows from the strategic complement-
arities between agents' actions, since the decision of an agent not to default makes it easier
for other agents not to default too.
It is well known in the literature that a binary game of strategic complements will in
general have multiple purestrategy Nash equilibria with a lattice structure. In particular,
this class of games has two extreme equilibria: the best equilibrium is the equilibrium
where the largest number of agents choose the maximal action (Non-Default) = 1 and the
worst equilibrium is the equilibrium where the largest number of agents choose the minimal
action (Default) = 0 .
For simplicity, for the remainder of this paper, we assume that at a Nash equilibrium
of the default game, no agent is indifferent between (Non-Default) = 1 and (Default) = 0,
2See, Sobel (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives (1990), Echenique and Sabarwal (2003), Amir
(2005), Echenique (2007) and Barraquer (2013) for other economic applications of games of strategic
complements.
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which is likely to be the case.3 The following result highlights the connection between the
multiplicity of equilibria and the structure of the financial network.
Proposition 2.2. If the default game has multiple Nash equilibria then, the financial
network has cyclical obligations.
Proposition 2.2 shows that the presence of a cycle of financial obligations is generically
necessary for the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) term this
phenomenon cyclical interdependence and illustrate it as follows: A default by Firm A
on its obligations to Firm B may lead B to default on its obligations to C. A default by C




















Figure 2.4.2: Unidirectional obligations
In the following, we will show that the close relationship between the multiplicity of
Nash equilibria and the cyclical financial interconnections is useful to solve for purestrategy
Nash equilibria of the default game. More specifically, we will provide an algorithm to find
all purestrategy Nash equilibria of the default game.
Recall that the financial network is strongly connected if there is a path of obligations
between all pairs of agents. A strongly connected component (henceforth, SCC) of the
financial network is a maximal4 strongly connected subnetwork.
3That is, this always holds except for a finite set of first-period endowments.
4In the sense that it is not properly contained in a larger SCC.
58
Default and coordination in financial networks
2.4.1 A financial network with a unique SCC
First, for simplicity, we consider the case of a financial network with a unique strongly
connected component. We will use the following notion of ear decomposition of a network,
which is useful given its close relationship to network connectivity. An ear decomposition
of a network is a partition of the set of agents into an ordered collection of agent-disjoint
simple paths, called ears. More precisely, an ear decomposition of a network is a partition
of the agents into E0, E1, . . . , Ep such that
• E0 = {v0} is a single agent;
• for each h = 1, . . . , p, it holds that Eh = {v1h , · · · , vkh} is a directed path such that
the endpoints of each Ehthat is, v1h and vkhare in E1∪. . .∪Eh−1 but the internal
agents of Ehthat is, v2h , · · · , v(k−1)hare not in E1 ∪ . . . ∪ Eh−1.5
A financial network is strongly connected if and only if it has an ear decomposition. In
the following, we will refine further the concept of ear decomposition. Given an ear Eh,
we say a subset of consecutive internal agents Rth = {vth , · · · , vsh} is a rim of the ear if
v(t−1)h is an ear's first agent and vsh is either an ear's first agent or Eh's penultimate agent
and none of the other agents in the rim is an ear's first agent. Hence the internal agents of
each ear can be partitioned into a collection of rims. Observe also that the last ear always
has a unique rim. In interpretation, the concept of rim represents a useful refinement of
the ear decomposition since the decision of agents outside a rim are affected only by the
last nondefaulting agent in the rim.
In the following, we will rely on this refinement of the ear decomposition to provide
an algorithm to find all purestrategy Nash equilibria of the default game of a financial
network with a unique SCC.
The algorithm, which we call USCCNE, goes as follows:
1. For each rim in the network, assume that each agent in the rim is the last nondefaulting
agent or that all agents in the rim are defaulting.
2. For every case in (1), start from the last ear Ep and repeat the following until reaching
the first ear E0: for each ear delete the internal agents and update the inflows of the
affected (intercepting) agents.
3. For every case of assumed actions in (1), start from the single agent v0 in E0 and
move along all agents in every ear in the opposite direction; for each agent compute,
the optimal action while taking feedback into consideration.6
5Each Eh (h = 1, . . . , p) is called an ear.
6That is, for agent i it holds that inflowi = aipii + bi, which vary according to the case considered.
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In interpretation, the USCCNE algorithm assumes for each rim that a particular agent
is the last non-defaulting agent or that all agents in the rim default. Then start from
the last ear and repeat the following until reaching the first ear: delete all the internal
agents of each ear and update the inflows of all affected (intercepting) agents. Finally, the
algorithm navigates every ear in the opposite direction computing the optimal actions of
all agents. The Nash equilibria correspond to the iterations where all the assumed actions
are satisfied.
The key feature of the USCCNE is that it exploits the fact that, in a given rim, all nodes
except the first one have only one in-going link. The algorithm consists of computing the
different possible inflows to each last node in every rim, by considering the different actions
by the previous nodes, its debtors. For every case that represents a set of assumptions, we
compute the action of the last node, starting from the last ear Ep and moving towards E0.
After computing the actions of these nodes, we move in the opposite direction, starting
from E0 to check whether the assumptions in each case are verified. When they are, it is
a Nash Equilibrium.7
The next example illustrates the default game.
Example 1. Consider an economy of ten agents connected through their ownership of
each other's liabilities, among which only the first nine agents are strategically relevant.
Agents' endowments in the first period are z1 = (25, 25, 40, 40, 60, 40, 40, 70, 24) and in the
second period are z2 = (3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3) and the interest rate is r = 0.1. All agents








i . The financial liabilities of agents to
each other are illustrated in the financial network in Figure 2.4.3.
This financial network contains a unique SCC, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, which has four
ears, E0 = {1} ;E1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1};E2 = {3, 6, 7, 8, 2}; and E3 = {7, 9, 1}, and five rims,
R2 = {2, 3}; R4 = {4, 5}; R6 = {6, 7}; R8 = {8}; and R9 = {9}.
In order to compute the Nash equilibria, we apply the USCCNE algorithm described
above. To illustrate this for a particular case we assume that all agents in all rims are
defaulting except R4 = {4, 5}, where 5 is the last non-defaulter. Deleting the internal





Deleting the internal agents of ear E2 and updating the inflows of the (intercepting) agents
7Observe that the USCCNE algorithm also provides a bound on the number of Nash equilibria.
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Figure 2.4.3: A financial network with ten agents














Finally, deleting the internal agents of ear E1 and updating the inflows of the (intercepting)





Since z21 = 3 and L1 = 35 it follows that the threshold agent 1 must at least pay in the
second period in order to avoid default is 3.68. Since rz11 = 2.5 < 3.68, it follows that agent








pi1 + 27.53 = 30.86.
Repeating the same procedure, will allow us to compute the actions and the payments of
all other agents in the economy and check whether we have a Nash equilibrium.
Considering all the cases, we find three Nash equilibria: the best equilibrium 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
the intermediate equilibrium 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, and the worst equilibrium 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
which we illustrate in Figures 2.4.4-2.4.6.
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Figure 2.4.5: The intermediate equilibrium
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Figure 2.4.6: The worst equilibrium
2.4.2 Arbitrary financial network
Now we investigate the case of an arbitrary financial network. Recall that an arbitrary
financial network can be transformed into a directed acyclic graph (henceforth, DAG)that
is, a network with no cyclesby contracting each SCC into a single large node (see Figures
2.4.7-2.4.8).
The algorithm described here (MSCCNE) is a generalisation of USCCNE. It consists of
applying the USCCNE to each SCC in any given arbitrary network starting by the SCCs
with no incoming link from any outside node or group of nodes, which are the SCCs that
are not impacted by the other nodes in the network, and moving along the chain of SCCs.
In the following, we will rely on transitive reduction, which is a uniquely defined op-
eration on a DAG, to compute the purestrategy Nash equilibria of a financial network
with multiple SCCs. A transitive reduction of a DAG is the network representation with
the fewest possible links that preserves the chains of default of the original financial net-
work(see Figure 8). It is hence constructed by removing all the links that are unnecessary
for the chain of default to be realised and only the nodes which were connected by a path
in the original network remain connected in the transitively reduced network. For instance,
if A links to B, and B links to C, then the transitive reduction removes the link from A
to C, if it exists.
Observe that, from the minimality of links in the transitive reduction, there exists a
unique partition of the set of agents W = {W1, . . . ,Wk} such that W1 corresponds to the
63
Default and coordination in financial networks
SCCs with no incoming links, W2 corresponds to the SCCs with only incoming links from
W1, W3 corresponds to the SCCs with only incoming links from W1 ∪W2, and so on.
Then, the algorithm USCCNE can be easily extended to compute the Nash equilibria
with multiple SCCs. The algorithm, which we call MSCCNE, goes as follows:
1. Apply USCCNE to find all Nash equilibria for each SCC in W1.
2. For each product of Nash equilibria of SCCs in W1, apply USCCNE to find all Nash
equilibria for each SCC in W2.
3. For each product of Nash equilibria of SCCs in W1 ∪W2, apply USCCNE to find all
Nash equilibria for each SCC in W3.












Figure 2.4.7: Example of a DAG
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Figure 2.4.9: Transitive reduction of the DAG
The MSCCNE algorithm is a simple algorithm that exploits a network decomposition
technique to find all the purestrategy Nash equilibria of a financial network. It is worth
noting that the MSCCNE algorithm can be easily adapted to compute the clearing payment
vector of Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Corollary 2.1. Assume that the first-period endowment of each agent i is zerothat is,
z1i = 0. Then the MSCCNE algorithm computes the clearing payment vector in Eisenberg
and Noe (2001).
Recall that the clearing payment vector of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) is unique under
mild conditions. Hence the existence of cyclical financial interconnections, while necessary
for multiple equilibria, is not sufficient.
At the heart of the seminal contribution of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) lies the elegant
fictitious default algorithm that computes the unique clearing payment vector. The fic-
titious default algorithm goes as follows. First, determine the set of agents who cannot
fulfil their obligation, even when we assume that all agents receive their due payments.
These agents will be called the first wave of default. Then, assume that the agents in the
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first wave of default pay their liabilities pro rata and the new defaulting agents will be
called the second wave of default and so on until the algorithm terminates. In this way,
the fictitious default algorithm produces a natural measure of systemic risk, which is the
number of waves required to induce a given agent to default.
Echenique (2007) provides the most efficient algorithm for computing all purestrategy
Nash equilibria in the class of games of strategic complements, of which the default game is
a special case. The algorithm elegantly checks whether there is another Nash equilibrium
once the smallest and largest purestrategy Nash equilibria are computed from classical
algorithms (for example, Topkis (1979)).
While each of the above algorithms is clearly interesting in many aspects, arguably,
the advantage of the MSCCNE algorithm developed in this paper is that it relies on the
financial network architecture to compute the Nash equilibria. Generally, algorithms that
exploit the financial network structure such as the algorithm developed in this paper,
as well as having a clear computational advantage, provide valuable information on the
strategic interactions among agents, as we will show below.
2.5 Policy Implications of central clearing
From a policy perspective, in view of the multiplicity of Nash equilibria of the default
game, there is the central policy question of equilibrium selection. In particular, it may
be desirable to implement the best equilibrium in order to achieve financial stability and
minimise the cost of default.
Given the best and the worst equilibria, agents in the network can be classified into
three types:8
1. agents that choose 0 in the worst equilibrium and 1 in the best equilibrium;
2. agents that choose 0 in the worst equilibrium and 0 in the best equilibrium;
3. agents that choose 1 in the worst equilibrium and 1 in the best equilibrium.
Note that agents of type (2) and (3) are not strategically relevant since they play the
same action in the worst and the best equilibrium. Actually, we could construct a reduced
financial network containing only agents of type (1). To do so, we first eliminate all
outgoing links emanating from agents of type (3) and, since none of them defaults, add
their liabilities pro rata to the cash flow of the agents intercepting their outgoing links. As
for agents of type (2), given that they default and pay their inflowsi.e. their cash flow and
the payments they receive from their debtorsthey can be eliminated from the network
8Obviously, it is not possible for an agent to choose 1 in the worst equilibrium and 0 in the best.
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by adding their cash flow to the cash flow of their creditors pro rata and by extending their
ingoing liabilities links to their creditors pro rata so that the new liabilities directly link
between their debtors and their creditors.
Recently, CCP has become increasingly the cornerstone of policy reform in financial
markets. Introducing a CCP in the financial network modifies the structure of the financial
network: each liability between a debtor and a creditor is erased and replaced by two new
liabilitiesone liability between the debtor and the CCP, and another one between the
CCP and the creditor. As a consequence, one of the key benefits of central clearing is that,
by breaking down the cyclical connections of financial liabilities, it reduces the aggregate
level of default exposure, which in turn reduces default contagion.
There is a growing literature which investigates the benefits of central clearing. Duffie
and Zhu (2011) show that CCP's reduce significantly the counterparty risk even when
clearing across multiple derivative classes. Zawadowski (2013) suggests that a CCP elim-
inates ex ante own default externalities by making banks contribute to the insurance of
counterparty risk in the form of a guarantee fund. In other respect, Tirole (2011) ar-
gues that centralisation should be encouraged and CCP's enhance transparency and allow
for multilateral netting. Acharya and Bisin (2014) study how the lack of transparency
between agents sharing default risk produce counterparty risk externality and show that
this externality disappears when introducing a centralized clearing mechanism which en-
sures transparency. They prove that the main advantage of central clearing is enhancing
the aggregation of information.
The following proposition points out another potential benefit of introducing central
clearing in financial markets.
Proposition 2.3. Introducing a CCP in each SCC of the reduced financial network achieves
the best equilibrium in the default game at no additional cost.
Proposition 2.3 shows that when a CCP intermediates the liabilities of each SCC of
the reduced financial network,9 the best equilibrium is achieved and the CCP is budget
neutral. As a consequence, in addition to reducing default contagion by eliminating the
cyclical financial interconnections, central clearing can also serve as a coordination device
that achieves the best equilibrium of the default game.
The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2 Consider an economy of six agents connected through their ownership of each
other's liabilities, among which only the first five agents are strategically relevant. Agents'
endowments in the first period are z1 = (22, 22, 75, 170, 100) and in the second period are
9That is, the financial network with only strategic relevant agents.
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Figure 2.5.1: A financial network with five agents









i . The financial liabilities of agents to each other are illustrated in the
network in Figure 2.5.1.
This financial network contains a unique SCC {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. To compute the Nash
equilibria, we apply the USCCNE algorithm described above. We find three Nash equi-
libriathe best equilibrium 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, the intermediate equilibrium 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, and the






















Figure 2.5.3: The intermediate equilibrium
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Figure 2.5.4: The worst Equilibrium
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Adding a CCP will result in a new financial network as shown in Figure 2.5.5, with the
following liabilities vector:
L˜ = (5, 5, 10, 10, 10,−40) .
Given that there are no feedback effects in the presence of the CCP, the minimum cash
flow for an agent i to escape default is equal to the new liability L˜i. Therefore, after the
introduction of a CCP, it is easy to check that the best equilibrium is implemented at no









Figure 2.5.5: Adding a CCP
2.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the introduction of a CCP allows agents playing different actions
at different Nash equilibria to achieve the best equilibrium at no additional cost. As
a consequence, central clearing can serve as a coordination device in financial markets.
While our result reinforces the key role CCP plays in financial markets, as highlighted
in several important contributions by Duffie and Zhu (2011), Tirole (2011), Zawadowski
(2013) and Acharya and Bisin (2014), it remains to be seen whether other policies can be
designed to minimise the number of defaults, such as identifying key agents and targeting
them through either cash injection or minimum endowment requirement.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Recall that the default game corresponds to a binary coordination game with two actions
(Default) = 0 and (Non-Default) = 1 among which agents must choose.
First, for each agent i we will show that Ti (a−i) is well-defined given other agents'
actions a−i ∈ {0, 1}N−1. To do so, for each agent i we consider an auxiliary economy with
a modified network of liabilities, where we eliminate all outgoing links emanating from agent
i and add his liabilities pro rata to the cash flow of the agents intercepting his outgoing
links. Hence, the matrix of relative liabilities in the auxiliary economy is αˆ = (αˆkj)k,j∈N ,
where αˆkj = αkj if k 6= i and αˆkj = 0 otherwise. Moreover, the (augmented) second-period
endowment of agent j in the auxiliary economy is zˆ2j = z
2
j + αijLi.
Now, given other agents' actions a−i, let xa−i = (x
a−i










j )j∈N denote the clearing payment vector, uniquely defined as in

















i = 0 it holds that
Ti (a−i) = max







Hence, the threshold Ti (a−i) is well-defined.
Moreover, it follows from Lemma 5 in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) (see, also, Theorem
6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990)) that pix
a−i
is increasing in xa−i , which, in turn, is
increasing in a−i. Hence, it follows from (2.6.1) that the threshold Ti (a−i) is decreasing in
a−i.
Proof of Theorem 2.1




1 if rz1i − Ti (a−i) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
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is increasing in a−i. By the KnasterTarski Theorem, there exists a fixed point of the
following map:
Ψ : {0, 1}N −→ {0, 1}N
Ψ (a) = (Ψ1 (a−1) , ...,Ψn (a−n)) ,
which will be a Nash equilibrium of the default game.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Suppose notthat is, the default game has multiple equilibria and the financial network
does not have cyclical obligations. Let R denote the set of agents who play 0 in the worst
Nash equilibrium and 1 in the best Nash equilibrium. Then the subnetwork induced by R
contains an agent i that does not have any ingoing link. As a consequence, the inflow of
agent i does not change between the worst equilibrium and the best equilibrium, and as a
result agent i will not change his choice in the worst equilibrium and the best equilibrium.
This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Adding a CCP in the middle of the financial network will net out the liabilities and will
sort agents into two types: debtors and creditors to the CCP. Let node 0 represent the








Hence, if L˜i0 is positive (resp. negative), agent i is a debtor (resp. creditor) to the CCP.
Since the best equilibrium can be reached, it follows that whenever agent i receives all
the liabilities from his debtors, he will choose not default. Therefore, it holds that










z2i + (1 + r) z
1
i ≥ L˜i0.
Hence, the non-default condition is satisfied for each agent in the network with liabilities
intermediated by the CCP and the best equilibrium is reached.
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3.1 Introduction
Financial crises, and in particular the crisis of 2008, have revealed that the composition
of the financial systems is of paramount importance to financial stability. Furthermore,
interconnections and links among different financial institutions, such as banks (commercial
and investment banks), hedge funds, insurance and reinsurance companies, and various
financial intermediaries, can be conducive to the diffusion of shocks and defaults via domino
effect. This risk of shock-waves contagion and the possible collapse of the system, caused
by the default of one or more financial institutions is known as systemic risk. This kind of
failure has damaging short-term and long-term effects that could possibly hit the economy
as a whole. For these reasons, systemic risk has been the subject of ongoing interest for
researchers as well as policymakers.
Different institutions in the financial sector are connected to each other through claims,
obligations and cross-holdings. Interbank markets allow banks to borrow from each other
when suffering from liquidity shortages and negative shocks. Essentially, the value of a
bank issuing a liability depends not only on its own financial health, but also on the
payments it receives from its debtors, which in turn depend on the payments they receive
from their own debtors, even though the bank, when making a decision, can only assess
the situation of its immediate debtors, and not that of other institutions whose defaults
and failure to repay debts might lead to its own default. In this sense, interdependencies
within the financial system are key to economic and financial outcomes.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the multiplicity of channels of exposure among
financial institutions that are part of a single financial network. An important channel
of systemic risk and shock contagion, albeit one that has not been investigated to the
same extent as liabilities, is credit lines  that is, promised payments or future potential
liabilities. A negative shock to an organisation will compromise its ability to honour its
commitments and to issue new obligations. The potential debtor-institutions, receivers of
credit lines, take financial or operational decisions based on the contingent credit lines they
were granted, and cutting back such funding opportunities would be costly for them.
The systemic importance of credit lines arises from their fragility in view of their
dependence not only on the failure of potential creditors, but also on minor shocks, contrary
to obligations, which, because of debt priority rules, are lost only in the event that the
debtor defaults. The main objective is to explore the role and to determine the payments
among banks in the network while following the standard conditions of priority of creditors
and potential debtors over shareholders, and limited liability. We also assume that banks
have equal priority  that is, no preferred creditor over others  and thus we adopt the
proportional payment mechanism. Moreover, we will drop the all-or-nothing payment
scheme: in the event that a bank fails to pay in full, it should distribute its available
resources proportionately to cover at least a part of its due payments.
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We introduce a fictitious default algorithm analogous to the one introduced by the fun-
damental paper of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) by incorporating credit lines in the interbank
network. This algorithm aims to determine which institutions default, and is a way to
assess each institution's exposure. Furthermore, it permits us to identify the systemically
relevant organisations and to evaluate the threat they pose to the stability of the finan-
cial network, namely the consequences of their default on the other (close and distant)
institutions.
At the level of policies that aim to reduce systemic risk and financial contagion, we
will explore central clearing before going over a motivation for targeting policies. First,
introducing a central clearing counterparty that executes multilateral netting of the in-
terbank liabilities and credit lines has a significant impact on the financial network archi-
tecture. The position of every node, and the weight and direction of its due payments,
is changed and the payment mechanism, the equilibrium computation and the resulting
defaults change accordingly. With respect to targeting policies, we study granting a small
amount of cash to the systemically relevant financial institutions.
There is a growing literature that studies different aspects and features of financial con-
tagion and systemic risk. Static financial networks have been studied using two approaches:
either by considering a regular or symmetric network structure that follows some particular
distribution, deriving general results and executing simulations to assess contagion (Nier
et al.(2007), Upper (2011)), or by examining how a given network fails and exploring its
properties (Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Cifuentes et al. (2005)). This chapter belongs to the
second category and considers a financial networks approach that uses graph theory and
its applications. In particular, we build on the model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001), which
introduces the notion of a clearing mechanism for the simultaneous payment of liabilities in
a static financial network using a fixed-point argument. Their results show that a clearing
vector always exists and is unique under mild conditions. In addition, they propose an
algorithm that computes the clearing vector and determines the chains of default.
Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014) study how interdependencies between banks lead to
cascading defaults and failure. They establish two different concepts representing two as-
pects of the interbank links and cross-holdings. The first one is integration, which identifies
the dependence on the counterparties and consequently how much a financial institution
is susceptible to others and their risks; the second concept is diversification, which repres-
ents the heterogeneity of the cross-holdings for each financial institution  in other words,
how many counterparties it has. These two concepts have distinctive and non-monotonic
impacts on cascades: integration expands the extent of contagion and hence defaults, but
reduces the probability of the first failure, while diversification increases the propagation of
cascades throughout the network and at the same time decreases the exposure level among
pairs of financial institutions.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015) build on the model by Eisenberg and
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Noe (2001) to assess interbank exposure. They show that there is a certain threshold of
magnitude of shocks, such that below it, the increase in the connectedness in the financial
network makes it more stable. In contrast, when the shock exceeds this level, a higher
degree of connectedness reduces stability and makes the system weaker and more exposed
to contagion and risk.
Many papers focus on interbank liabilities as a channel of risk propagation without
analysing credit lines or other possible channels among financial institutions. A pertinent
paper by Muller (2006) investigates the credit lines in the Swiss interbank market as a
channel of financial contagion in addition to the liabilities exposure channel. Relying
on data and a simulated default situation, the findings indicate that both channels are
relevant and constitute a source of systemic risk. The author supposes that each bank can
have an opportunity to raise a credit line if it is short on liquidity and the corresponding
counterparties can provide it. In this way, she introduces this new channel of contagion
of defaults. In our chapter, the payment of the credit line is now enforced whenever
the potential creditor resources allow that, in contrast to Muller's assumption that the
benefiting party can only use their credit line if they are defaulting or illiquid. We define
an interbank network with two types of links, liabilities and credit lines, which both take
part in the clearing mechanism. The payment of credit lines is computed simultaneously
with the repayments of the debt, which results in one clearing vector.
The other part of the chapter examines possible policies that can be employed in order
to mitigate this domino effect in the financial network: central clearing and targeting
policies. The paper by Demange (2018) explores welfare improving policies in the interbank
liabilities network. Her approach follows Eisenberg and Noe (2001) in studying clearing
vectors and extends it by introducing a measure of the threat that a particular bank poses
to the level of repayments in the network, called the threat index, which identifies the
most systemically relevant banks for which a targeted cash injection would be optimal.
This chapter also contributes to the literature studying the role of central clearing coun-
terparties (henceforth CCP) in financial systems. Several articles and papers published by
researchers and Central Banks have examined the efficiency of CCPs. For instance, two pa-
pers issued by the Bank of England present a numerical approach by treating the financial
resources and the loss-allocation rules of a central counterparty, while other research, such
as that by Koeppl and Monnet (2010) and Duffie and Zhu (2011), has shown the theoretical
efficiency of CCPs. Amini, Filipovic and Minca (2014) highlighted several theoretical im-
plications of the introduction of a central clearing counterparty to the network of interbank
liabilities. Their main results emphasise the positive impact of a CCP on aggregate surplus
in the network; nevertheless, its impact on systemic risk is uncertain. They provide con-
ditions on the guarantee fund of the CCP to enhance reduction of systemic risk. Acharya
and Bisin (2014) discuss the role of central clearing in improving information aggregation.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We start by describing the theoretical
framework by defining a financial network for liabilities and credit lines in Section 3.2 and
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we prove the existence of a payment equilibrium. Section 3.3 describes the computation of
the payment vector using a fictitious default algorithm. In Section 3.4 we explore central
clearing for liabilities alone, credit lines alone, and liabilities and credit lines. Section 3.5
discusses a motivation for cash injection, and Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Defining the network
Consider an economy E constituted of a setN = {1, 2, ..., n} of distinct financial institutions
which we call from now on banks for simplicity. The economy will be formalised by a
weighted directed network with n nodes. Each bank has a cash flow zi that is a result of
operations conducted outside the financial system, which is assumed to be exogenous. We
assume that there is no external debt; in this sense, zi is non-negative and a bank does not
hold any liability outside the banking sector. Furthermore, the banks forming the financial
network are connected via two types of links: liabilities and credit lines. Initially, banks
exchange debt contracts within the network and make promises of providing credit lines.
We suppose that all liabilities and credit lines have the same maturity and all corresponding
payments should be offset at the same point in time. It can also be thought of in terms
of banks signing debt contracts and promises of credit lines payments at any date prior to
the maturity date under consideration, and that this setting does not include any other
possible liabilities or credit lines maturing at future dates.
The interbank liabilities structure is represented by the n× n matrix L = (Lij) where Lij
is the magnitude of i's nominal liability to j, such that Lii = 0 ∀i. Each bank will have a
sum of their total liabilities  L¯i  that they will have to repay: L¯i =
∑
j Lij .
The relative liability is defined by taking the ratio of the liability from a given bank i to a
bank j over the total amount of liabilities of i to determine the proportion of i's debt to j





if L¯i > 0
0 otherwise
with α being the corresponding n× n relative liabilities matrix .
Similarly, the interbank credit lines structure is represented by the n×n matrix C = (Cij)
where Cij is the magnitude of i's promised payment to j, and Cii = 0 ∀i.
The total amount of credit lines of bank i is C¯i =
∑
j Cij . In a similar way, we define the





if C¯i > 0
0 otherwise
with β the n× n relative credit lines matrix.
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Note that we have ∀i, ∑nj=1 αij = 1 and ∑nj=1 βij = 1. In matrix notation, it is written
as α1 = 1 and β1 = 1.
The liability and credit line structures are not symmetric. That is, Lij and Lji are not ne-
cessarily equal, and the same is true for Cij and Cji. Moreover, both can be simultaneously
positive.
While the above definitions of liabilities and credit lines seem similar, the two concepts are
quite different. Liabilities are the debts a bank holds for other banks in the network, which,
if not settled, lead to default. Credit lines, on the other hand, are potential obligations
banks have promised to issue for other banks, which if not met, their issuers do not default.
Definition 3.1. A financial network in an economy E associated with the financial struc-
ture
(
α, β, L¯, C¯, z
)
is a directed multi-graph with two types of links, where the nodes are
the financial institutions and the edges are of two types: liabilities and credit lines. A
directed edge from vertex i to j represents the debt of i to j, that is, i → j if Lij > 0, or
equivalently, αij > 0, and a dashed directed edge from vertex i to vertex j represents the
promised credit line by i to j, that is, i 99K j if Cij > 0, or equivalently, βij > 0.
Equivalently, it is a set of n nodes representing financial institutions and constituting two
overlapping networks, each of them defined by a particular type of links. Despite the fact
that a node is part of the two networks and might have positive liabilities and credit lines
simultaneously, its characteristics such as position in each network and centrality, may
differ.
Assumptions In order to determine the clearing payment vector, we will establish the
following standard assumptions.
(i) Debt seniority. Meeting the liabilities is prior to paying the credit lines and to
distributing shareholders' equity. If a bank does not have enough resources to pay
its liabilities and credit lines in total, it should use the available resources to fulfil its
liabilities.
(ii) Equal seniority. Liabilities have the same seniority, and credit lines as well; re-
payments are proportional in case of default. For liabilities, no creditor is more
important than another: if the debtor is defaulting and is not able to repay his ob-
ligations in full, he should pay his creditors pro rata. Furthermore, for credit lines,
all the potential debtors have equal priority and are paid proportionately in case the
given bank is incapable of settling all the promised amounts.
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(iii) Credit lines seniority over equity. Credit lines must be paid before paying equity.
If a bank meets its liabilities, it pays its credit lines and then distributes equity; if
that is not feasible, it spends what is left of its inflows to settle a part of its promised
credit lines.
(iv) Non-negative equity. The total payment made by each bank should not exceed
the inflows the bank is receiving.
Payment vector Based on the above assumptions, each bank will pay at most the
total value of its liabilities and credit lines. Let pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) denote the vector of
payments, where pii is the total payment made by bank i which is bounded above by the
total amount of liabilities and credit lines of i such that pii ∈
[
0, L¯i + C¯i
]
. Let piij be the
payment that i will make to j. It can include both liabilities and credit lines payments:
piij ∈ [0, Lij + Cij ] .
We define fi as bank i's inflows. They constitute all the resources available for i that can
be used to make its due payments and to distribute equity to shareholders if possible. It
will be the sum of all the payments that i receives from other banks whether in the form
of liabilities or credit lines, added to i's cash flow:




State of a bank It is possible to distinguish between three realisable states for a given
bank in this setting.
(i) Defaulter: the resources it has at hand are not enough to complete the payment
of its liabilities; hence, it defaults and repays part of them proportionately without
extending any credit lines as promised:
D =
{
i ∈ N : pii < L¯i
}
(ii) Distressed: the resources are enough to cover all liabilities debt but only a part of




i ∈ N : L¯i ≤ pii < L¯i + C¯i
}




i ∈ N : pii = L¯i + C¯i
}
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3.2.2 Payment equilibrium
Clearing payment vector existence and uniqueness Using a fixed-point argument,





Given α the relative liabilities matrix, β the relative credit lines matrix, L¯ = (L¯1, L¯2, . . . , L¯n)
the vector of total liabilities for each node, C¯ = (C¯1, C¯2, . . . , C¯n) the vector of total credit
lines for each node and z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) the vector of cash flows, we define the map:
Φ:
[
0 , L¯+ C¯
] 7→ [0 , L¯+ C¯]
by
Φ(pi) ≡ ((z + piT ) ∧ (L¯+ C¯)).
The clearing payment vector pi∗ = (pi∗1, pi∗2, . . . , pi∗n), consistent with the conditions of the
payment mechanism, is a fixed point of the map Φ(·). Each bank will pay the minimum
between its inflows fi that are constituted by its cash flow zi and the payments it receives∑
j pi
∗
ji, and the total value of its obligations and promised credit lines L¯i + C¯i.
pi∗i = min
{





pi∗ji ; L¯i + C¯i}
The payment made by bank i is the sum of its payments to all the other nodes in the
system could be formally written as follows:
pi∗ij =





Lij + βij(fi − L¯i) if fi ∈
[
L¯i ; L¯i + C¯i
]
Lij + Cij if fi ∈
[
L¯i + C¯i ; ∞
)
In the first case, the bank defaults and pays all its inflows as part of its scheduled liabilities;
whereas in the second case, the bank is distressed and despite not defaulting, it faces
trouble meeting credit lines payments. In the third case, the bank is safe and reimburses as
promised. This can be summarised in a one-vector characterisation as stated by Proposition
3.1.
Proposition 3.1. The payment made by a bank i to a bank j, which includes a liability
and/or a credit line payment, can be formally written as:
pi∗ij = min{αij min{zi +
∑
j
pi∗ji ; L¯i}+ βij(zi +
∑
j
pi∗ji − L¯i)+ ; Lij + Cij}. (3.2.1)
Proof. See Appendix B.
80
Credit lines contagion in financial networks
3.2.3 Characterisation of two separate payment vectors
Since liabilities and credit lines do not have the same seniority, and according to the
aforementioned assumption a bank must repay all its liabilities before starting to pay its
promised credit lines, the payment vector pi is formed by two components and can be
divided into two separate vectors: one for the liabilities payment a, and one for the credit
lines payment b.
For every node i:







where ai and bi are i's liabilities and credit lines payments respectively. Here aij is the
liabilities payment from i to j; and bij is the credit line payment from i to j.









Since the payment should be made made pro rata, then we will have: aij = αijai and
bij = βijbi.
The relationship between a and b can be depicted by the assumption of priority of liability
over credit line, which implies that if the liabilities payment for each bank i is less than
the total amount due, the credit line payment is equal to zero.
∀i such that aij ≤ Lij for some j =⇒ bij = 0,
or, equivalently,
ai ≤ L¯i =⇒ bi = 0.
The credit line payment is only positive when the owed liabilities are reimbursed in total:
bi ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ai = L¯i.
Moreover, a defaulting node will pay the part of the obligations that it can afford pro rata,
and will not pay any of the credit lines.
Cash flows to bank i can therefore be redefined as follows:













This can be written in matrix notation: f = z + αTa+ βT b.
Definition 3.2. The value of equity of node i, ei is defined to be the inflows to i less the
payments made by i:










βTijbj − ai − bi.
The same separation argument formerly used allows us to show that two clearing vectors
a∗ and b∗ exist, such that the payment of liabilities from i to j is determined by comparing
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For the credit lines payment, we must compare the value of the C¯i with what is left





C¯i ; (fi − L¯i)
}]+
.




a∗ij = min{L¯i ; fi} = min



















C¯i ; fi − L¯i
}]+
= min













Proof. See Appendix B.
The clearing payment vector is a fixed point
a∗
b∗
 of the map:
Ψ
(










 ; α, β, L¯, C¯, z
 ≡
 L¯ ∧ (αTa+ βT b+ z)[
C¯ ∧ (αTa+ βT b+ z − L¯)] ∨ 0
 .
The following results establish existence and uniqueness of a clearing payment vector.
Theorem 3.1. Given any α, β, L¯, C¯ and z,
(1) There exist a greatest and a least clearing payment vectors pi+and pi−.
(1') Similarly, if we consider two separate payment vectors, there exist greatest and
least clearing liabilities and credit lines payment vectors a+and a−, and b+ and
b− respectively.
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 are two clearing vectors:
(
z + αTa′ + βT b′ − L¯− C¯)+ = (z + αTa′′ + βT b′′ − L¯− C¯)+ .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 3.1. The clearing (total) payment vector pi∗ is unique.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.3 Fictitious default algorithm
3.3.1 Intuition
In this section, we present a fictitious default algorithm that serves to compute the pay-
ments of liabilities and credit lines in the financial system. By adding the credit lines
contagion channel, we will study the defaults that are caused by the failure of some banks
to pay their promised credit lines. As mentioned above, there are three possible situations
for a bank: either it can fail to pay its due liabilities and hence its credit lines as well, in
which case it defaults; or it can pay all its liabilities and all its credit lines; or it is able to
pay all its liabilities and only a part of its credit lines. The last case captures the defaults
induced by the interbank credit lines: despite the fact that a bank that is paying only a
part of its credit lines does not default, it might cause the default of another bank.
The first step of the simulation is to assume that all the nodes pay all their due liabilities
and credit lines  that is, ∀i, pii = L¯i + C¯i. Now, for each node, take the equity value,
difference between what it received and what it paid: ei = zi +
∑
j piji − pii. If this equity
value is negative, compute zi +
∑
j piji − L¯i. If it is negative, then this node is defaulting.
If it is positive, this node is able to pay its liabilities and does not default, but it can pay
only part of its credit lines.
If some nodes have negative equity values, compute the values again by assuming only
the nodes that defaulted in the first step are now defaulting and will pay part of their
obligations pro rata, and that only the non-defaulting nodes with negative equity values
are paying part of their credit lines, also pro rata, while all the other nodes pay in full.
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This allows us to detect the new defaults caused by the defaults and the partial credit lines
payments from the first step. We repeat the same process until no new defaults occur.
This algorithm determines which banks default, and is a way to assess each bank's
exposure. It will also enable us to identify the systemically important banks and evaluate
the threat that they pose to the stability of the financial network, namely the consequences
of their default on the other banks.
3.3.2 Algorithm
The fixed-point operator Φ has a set of super-solutions S:
S = {pi ∈ [0 ; L¯+ S¯] : Φ(pi) ≤ pi} .
It is the set of the payment vectors under which some node is paying other nodes more
than its total inflows.
We define the default set D(pi) under pi for all pi ∈ S as:
D(pi) =
{
i : Φ(pi)i < L¯i
}
.
We recall that if a node pays its obligations but does not pay its promised credit lines, it
does not default. The default only occurs if a node is not able to pay its total liabilities.
Define Λ(pi) the n× n diagonal matrix such that:
Λ(pi)ij =
1 i = j and i ∈ D(pi)0 otherwise .
The matrix I − Λ(pi) converts the entries corresponding to defaulting nodes under pi to 0.
The non-defaulting nodes under pi represented by I − Λ(pi) will pay their total liabilities.
We still need to investigate their credit lines payments.
For a fixed pi′, the non-defaulting nodes I −Λ(pi′) will pay either L¯+ C¯ or L¯ and a part of
C¯, which will be less than L¯+ C¯.
Hence, it will be convenient to define a set of nodes that are not able to pay their promised
credit lines fully but will pay their full liabilities:
G(pi) =
{
i : L¯i < Φ(pi)i < L¯i + C¯i
}
.
And we define accordingly the n× n matrix Γ(pi) such that:
Γ(pi)ij =
1 i = j and i ∈ G(pi)0 otherwise .
The matrix I − Γ(pi) represents the diagonal matrix with entries 1 for the nodes that are
able to pay their liabilities and credit lines in total.
For fixed pi′ ∈ S, we define the map:
Fpi′ : pi → Fpi′(pi)
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Λ(pi′)pi + (I − Λ(pi′)) (Γ(pi′)L¯+ (I − Γ(pi′)L¯))]+
βT
[
Λ(pi′)× 0 + (I − Λ(pi′)) (Γ(pi′) (pi − L¯)+ (I − Γ(pi′))) C¯]+ z}
+ (I − Λ(pi′)){Γ(pi′) [L¯+ (pi − L¯)]+ (I − Γ(pi′)) [L¯+ C¯]}
This map shows that all defaulting nodes under pi′ will pay pi and it will be a liabilities
payment, while the non-defaulting ones will pay the total amount of their liabilities but
will be divided into two categories: those that will pay all their credit lines (above their
liabilities), and those that will pay all the liabilities but only part of their credit lines,
which will amount to pi − L¯ . Fpi′ has a unique fixed point f(pi′).
The sequence of payment vectors which represents the fictitious default sequence is
• pi0 = L¯ + C¯, since we start by assuming that all nodes pay all their liabilities and
credit lines in the first step.
• pij = f(pij−1).
3.4 Policy implication: central clearing
The transmission of systemic risk is costly for individuals, institutions and economies. The
interest in generating strategies and tools to reduce systemic risk has thrived due to the
need for a stable and efficient financial system. Policymakers attempt to design regulations
and laws to prevent the outbreak and propagation of shocks and preserve stability. In this
context, regulators have tackled the idea of creating central counterparty clearing houses
in an effort to ameliorate financial market infrastructure. Central clearing can be thought
of as a risk-sharing or an insurance arrangement. The main functions of a central clear-
ing counterparty (CCP) are to improve the aggregate surplus by assuming the bilateral
obligations, reducing the number of obligations and guaranteeing their settlement. The
concept of CCP was applied to the interbank liabilities structure as an effective tool to
induce efficiency, as shown by Duffie and Zhu (2011), Zawadowski (2013) and Acharya and
Bisin (2014). We explore the introduction of central clearing to the credit lines interbank
network structure. A central clearing institution for credit lines would clear out bilateral
credit lines and consequently reduce counterparty risk. By adding a central clearing insti-
tution to the credit lines network, we obtain a star-shaped network with the CCP as the
central node. Figure 3.4.1 illustrates the case of a network of five banks.
The direction of the edge between a given node and the central clearing institution
depends on the net liability between the two and more precisely on the net liabilities of a
given node  that is, on the difference between what it owes to others and what others owe
to it. This states whether a bank is a credit line receiver from or a payer to the CCP.
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Figure 3.4.1: Central clearing for a network of five banks
3.4.1 Motivation: numerical example
Consider the simple case of a network of liabilities, constituted of three nodes nodes 
A, B and C  having circular interdependences. Suppose the interbank liabilities are as
displayed in Figure 3.4.2. A and B are linked by LAB = 100 and LBA = 40, B and C by









Figure 3.4.2: Over-the-counter liabilities structure
Figure 3.4.3 shows the network after bilateral netting between every pair of banks.
There is a directed link between every two nodes representing the net liability resulting







Figure 3.4.3: Bilateral netting
To examine the degree of contagion in the network and the spread of defaults, we take as
an example z = (7, 10, 5) as the cash flow vector. Following the fictitious default algorithm
established in the preceding section, we notice that in the first step, C will default, since
its inflows (after assuming that all liabilities are settled) are 5+45 = 50 < LCA = 60. And
this default will prompt A's default in the next step: its inflows will be 50 + zA = 57 < 60.
The algorithm will end here with two defaults as a result.
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Adding a CCP Suppose now that we add at the centre of the network a central clearing
counterparty CCP that will execute a multilateral netting. A should pay 60 to B and receive
60 from C; it will have a net liability of 0 in the presence of the CCP. B has to pay 45 to
C and receive 60 from A, and thus it will owe the CCP 60 − 45 = 15; and C will have to






Figure 3.4.4: Multilateral netting: adding a CCP
Comparing the two networks before and after adding the CCP (Figure 3.4.3 and Figure
3.4.4), we notice that the CCP can have an important impact on the systemic risk in the
network. If we suppose that bank A is hit by a shock that causes its default and failure
to pay its debt to B in full, this will put B at risk. Moreover, take the case where A's
payment to B added to B's cash flow is strictly less than LBC  in this case, B also defaults
and puts C at risk. When we have central multilateral clearing, a shock hitting A does not
affect the other banks, and thus the propagation of the shock throughout the network is
avoided.
If we go back to the numerical example of the above fictitious algorithm with the vector
of cash flow z = (7, 10, 5), now with the presence of the CCP, the number of defaults in the
system is reduced: C defaults and cannot pay its debt to the CCP, but A is not affected.
In this way, the algorithm will terminate in one step.
On the other hand, even if a node that is supposed to make a payment to the CCP,
defaults and pays only part of this liability, the CCP can cover up using several margins
and its guarantee fund to prevent its default.
However, if the CCP fails to cover up and its reserves and funds are not sufficient,
causing it to default, its default could increase the systemic risk in the system.
This basic yet representative model can be generalised to a broader and more complic-
ated network of n financial institutions.
In what follows, we will apply the central clearing concept to our model: first by adding
a CCP to the liabilities network while keeping the credit lines network as it is; and second
by adding a CCP for both networks simultaneously.
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3.4.2 Clearing with a CCP for liabilities
Framework
Consider again the economy, E , with N = {1, 2, ..., n} distinct financial institutions, where
the liabilities structure is represented by the n × n matrix L = (Lij) and the credit lines
structure is represented by the n×n matrix C = (Cij). Now suppose we introduce a CCP
for liabilities.
We add a new node, denoted by 0, to the network representing the CCP.
Consider now an auxiliary economy, ECCP, with N˜ = N
⋃{0} = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} distinct
financial institutions. Each node i in {1, 2, . . . , n} has a cash flow zi as in E , while z0
denotes the guarantee fund of the CCP. As usual, z0 is assumed to be positive, meaning
that the CCP does not hold any liability outside the banking sector.
In the auxiliary economy, ECCP, the liabilities structure is represented by the (n+1)×(n+1)
matrix LCCP = (L˜ij), defined as follows:
L˜ij = −L˜ji =
0 if i and j 6= 0∑n
k=1 Lik −
∑n
k=1 Lki if j = 0
.
Similarly, the interbank credit lines structure in the auxiliary economy, ECCP, is represented
by the (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix CCCP = (C˜ij), defined as follows:
C˜ij =
0 if i or j = 0Cij otherwise .
The liabilities network in the auxiliary economy is a star-shaped network where the CCP
occupies the central position and the other banks are on the periphery. Each bank has
no liabilities to any other bank, while its (net) liability to the CCP corresponds to the
difference between the total liabilities that the node should pay and the receivable that the
node should receive. Observe that in the auxiliary economy, ECCP, the CCP's liabilities
are equal to the CCP's receivables, which simply highlights the role of the CCP of clearing
liabilities.
The credit lines network remains the same for all banks with the addition of having the
CCP as an isolated node.
We assume that in the event that the CCP defaults, the payment will be executed propor-
tionately. Hence, our approach in Section 3 above computes the clearing payment vector
of the auxiliary economy, ECCP. Indeed, after treating the CCP as a node of the network,
we can apply the preceding findings from Sections 2 and 3 to this network of n+ 1 nodes:
{0, 1, ..., n}.
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique clearing payment vector pi∗ = (pi∗0, pi∗1, . . . , pi∗n).
Proof. See Appendix B.
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This proposition can be naturally extended to the settings below where the CCP is
clearing the credit lines market, and where it is clearing both markets of the liabilit-
ies and credit lines simultaneously. Here, since the liabilities network in the auxiliary
economy,ECCP, is a star-shaped network and there are no direct interbank liabilities pay-
ments anymore, then the defaults emerging from this network can be directly computed by
checking the repayments to the node 0 representing the CCP, while the contagion and the
multi-step default algorithm take place in the standard credit lines network. Consequently,
the presence of the CCP, even if its multilateral netting is restricted to the liabilities net-
work, will accelerate the convergence of the fictitious default algorithm. As in the previous
three-nodes example, in the general case of n nodes the number of links in the network is
considerably diminished: instead of having several links (up to n− 1 links) with the other
nodes of the liabilities network, each node would have at most one link with the CCP.
This reduces the total computational load in any practical calculation, in particular the
fictitious default algorithm.
3.4.3 Clearing with a CCP for credit lines
Framework
We examine here central clearing for credit lines only. The auxiliary economy, ECCP, is the
set N˜ = N
⋃{0} = {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} of financial institutions where {0} is the CCP. Similarly
to before, each node i ∈ N˜ has a cash flow zi as in E , while z0 denotes the guarantee fund
of the CCP. In the auxiliary economy, ECCP, the liabilities structure is represented by the
(n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix LCCP = (L˜ij), defined as follows:
L˜ij = −L˜ji =
0 if i or j = 0Lij otherwise .
Credit lines, meanwhile, are represented by the (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix CCCP = (C˜ij),
defined by
C˜ij =
0 if i 6= 0 and j 6= 0∑
k∈N Cik −
∑
k∈N Cki if j = 0
.
In this case, the credit lines are covered by the CCP, and furthermore, they cease to
constitute a channel of default contagion. If one or more banks fail to meet their promised
credit lines, other banks do not bear the distress. If the source of risk in a given financial
system is at the level of the credit lines exposure channel rather than the liabilities channel,
this risk is eliminated by the introduction of the CCP. In other words, the CCP acts as
a lender of last resort when it issues new liabilities and fulfils the credit lines that the
distressed banks failed to meet. For instance, if there is a low economic conjecture, for a
period of time, the intervention of the CCP, by extending the promised credit lines, can
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buy time for the banks and the financial institutions, and the economy as a whole, to
recover while avoiding default and failure of distressed institutions.
3.4.4 Clearing with a CCP for liabilities and credit lines
Understandably, default contagion may still occur even in the presence of clearing with
a CCP for liabilities, since the interbank network structure for credit lines is not cleared;
it is equally the case when a CCP is clearing the credit lines market only. This brings
about the policy question of whether to extend the role of CCP to clear both liabilities
and credit lines. We will try to investigate this case in what follows while maintaining the
assumption of priority of the liabilities over the credit lines for the CCP. Moreover, z0,
which represents the guarantee fund of the CCP, is assumed to be quite large in the way
that the CCP hardly defaults.
Example
Consider an economy of four financial institutions: A, B, C and D. Suppose the interbank











Figure 3.4.5: Network of four banks
Suppose the cash flow vector is z = (5, 5, 5, 5). Following the default algorithm designed
in Section 3.3, bank C will default in the first step. In step two, A and B will default and
the algorithm will end.











Figure 3.4.6: Central clearing for the liabilities network
After adding the CCP to liabilities, we notice that with the same cash flow vector used
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above, C still defaults in the first step, while in the second step, A is not affected, but
B defaults due to C's default and its failure to extend its promised credit line to B. This











Figure 3.4.7: Central clearing for the credit lines and liabilities networks
In this case, with the same cash flow vector as before, z = (5, 5, 5, 5), only C defaults
in the first step and the algorithm terminates. The contagion effect is therefore reduced
with the introduction of CCP to this four nodes network. The assumption that z0 is large
is important to prevent the CCP from defaulting and in this way the default algorithm
becomes trivial.
General framework
In this section, we extend our analysis to a general network of n + 1 nodes, n banks and
a CCP for credit lines and liabilities. For simplicity, we will introduce only one CCP for
both, and it will be at the centre of the two overlapping networks.
The liabilities and credit lines amounts that node i should pay to all other nodes in the
network and here to the CCP are respectively Li =
∑n
j=1 Lij and Ci =
∑n
j=1Cij .
Consider again the auxiliary economy ECCP. Also, as before, each node i in {1, 2, . . . , n}
has a cash flow zi that is assumed to be positive as in E , while z0 denotes the guarantee
fund of the CCP.
The liabilities structure is represented by the (n+1)×(n+1) matrix LCCP = (L˜ij), defined
as before.
Similarly, the interbank credit lines structure in the auxiliary economy is represented by
the (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix CCCP = (C˜ij), and is now defined as follows:
C˜ij = −C˜ji =
0 if i and j 6= 0∑n
k=1Cik −
∑n
k=1Cki if j = 0
.
In line with what was previously explained concerning central clearing in the liabilities
network, the auxiliary economy ECCP still takes the form of a star-shaped network where
the CCP is the central node. In addition, none of the banks have any liabilities or credit
lines to any other bank, while the (net) liability and the (net) credit line to the CCP
represent the difference between what it should be and what it should receive. As above,
the CCP's liabilities are equal to the CCP's receivables (liabilities), and the CCP's payable
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credit lines are equal to the CCP's receivable credit lines.
The existence and the uniqueness of the clearing payment vector in this framework of
the model can be promptly derived using the same mathematical methodology. It is
important to emphasise that all the payments of liabilities and credit lines occur directly
and bilaterally between each bank and the system, in contrast with the previous scenario,
where payments were done between banks themselves in a more complicated way.
With regard to the default algorithm, the number of links in the network diminishes even
more when we apply central clearing to the credit lines network: instead of having up to
n− 1 liabilities links and n− 1 credit lines links for every node, it would have at most two
links with the CCP (one liability and one credit line). Therefore, the convergence of the
fictitious default algorithm will be even more accelerated.
3.5 Policy implication: cash injection
Our analysis may also pave the way for policy intervention, which may take the form
of either funds redistribution or cash injection, in order to trigger increases in debt reim-
bursement, credit line payment and the net cash flow in the network. Understandably, such
interventions may potentially involve designing incentive-compatible solidarity policies to
transfer funds from safe organisations to risky organisations, which would prevent them
from defaulting and as a consequence the whole network from bearing the costs of such
defaults.
In the following, we will discuss the possibility of cash injection which can be regarded
as a positive increase in the cash flow of the banks receiving it. For this purpose, we suppose
that the objective is to maximise the total payments in the financial system subject to the
constraints of limited liability, and the payment of every bank i not exceeding its total due













piji + zi for all i
3.5.1 Examples
An evident example of the effectiveness of cash injection policies and the importance of
targeting the right nodes is the star network  also known as the core-periphery network
(Figure 3.5.1).
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Figure 3.5.1: Star network
Suppose a shock hits the central node and as a result does not pay promised credit
lines to the peripheries, which may result in the default of some of them. The question
here is: should cash injection target the central node or defaulting nodes?
An extension of the star network, which is also representative of the contagion effect,
is the tree (Figure 3.5.2).
0
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A regulator has a certain amount of cash which she can provide to some banks in order to
increase the payments in the financial system.
Cash injection to safe banks that are already paying their entire debt and promised
credit would not affect the overall payments in the network unless it is stipulated that cash
injection is compounded with a matching rate m > 0 for credit lines. That is, the target
bank receiving the cash injection is forced to increase its credit lines by (1 +m). This may
have a different policy effect, as an increase in the cash inflows would improve the rate of
reimbursement of liabilities and the extension of credit lines in the financial network.
However, here we consider that a cash injection targets either defaulting or distressed
banks.
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Suppose that distressed banks are targeted by an injection of a small amount of cash,
 ∈ R+ . First, let piD, piG and piS be the payment vectors of the defaulters, distressed
banks and safe banks respectively. Accordingly, let αA,B be the matrix of relative liabilities
from banks in set A to banks in set B such that A,B ∈ {D,G, S}. Moreover, LD, LGand
LS are the corresponding liabilities vectors. Define βA,B and CS in a similar way.











j∈S βjiC¯j ; L¯i+ C¯i}. We
suppose that  is small enough such that it is still insufficient for i to fulfil all its promised
credit lines C¯i and















A cash injection to bank i ∈ G has two effects on the payments in the network and on i
in particular: initially, it directly increases the payment made by i and the inflows to the
receivers of i's credit lines; additionally, it increases the inflows to i if i is on a cycle of
defaulters or receivers of credit lines. If for instance a bank i ∈ G receives a cash injection,
and j is such that Cij > 0 and there is a bank k such that Ljk, j ∈ D and/or Cjk > 0, j ∈ G
and Lki, k ∈ D and/or Cki > 0, k ∈ G, then inflows to i from k increase as i's credit line
payment increases.
In matrix notation:
piG = z + + αD,GpiD + αG,GLG + αS,GLS + βG,G(f − LG) + βS,GCS
In order to assess the impact that an increase in credit lines payment has on the overall
system, we consider the two separate payment vectors approach, with a and b being the
payment vectors of liabilities and credit lines respectively. After injecting a small amount
 to i ∈ G, such that i remains in G after receiving the cash, the credit lines payment of
i ∈ G becomes:
















bG, = zG + 1G + α
D,GaD + αG,GLG + αS,GLS + βS,GCS + βG,GbG,
such that bG, is the g×1 vector of credit lines payments of distressed banks after injecting
an amount  into each of them, zG the g × 1 vector of cash flows of distressed banks, 1G
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the g × 1 vector with entries 1, αD,G, αG,G and αS,G the relative liabilities matrices from
defaulting (d× g), distressed (g × g) and safe ((n− d− g)× g) banks to distressed banks
respectively, βS,Gand βG,G the corresponding relative credit lines matrices, aD the d × 1
liabilities payment vector of defaulting banks, LG and LS the liabilities vectors of banks
in G and S, and CS the credit lines vector of banks in S.
3.5.3 Cash injection
When considering two channels of systemic risk contagion, a given bank faces two types
of risks: the risk of defaulting as a consequence of not receiving promised credit lines,
and the risk of defaulting as a consequence of its debtors not paying their due liabilities.
Equivalently, the two types of banks that are perturbed are defaulters as well as distressed.
Demange (2018) defines a threat index that takes into account the spillover effects of a
defaulting bank and shows that a cash injection would be optimal if the receivers have the
largest threat indices whenever the set of defaulting banks is kept unchanged, meaning that
no defaulting bank escapes default after the injection. She also proves that cash injection
for the banks that have a higher probability of defaulting might be suboptimal.
We extend this result here and apply it to our setting with two channels of defaults. We
define two threat indices: the first one is that of defaulters, which takes into consideration
spillover effects that emerge via the liabilities channel, while the second index is that of
distressed banks, which accounts for spillover effects through the credit lines channel.
More precisely, the maximisation problem P, stated at the beginning of Section 3.5, can
be split into to problems each to maximise one type of payments as follows. If a regulator's















βjibj + zi for all i















βjibj + zi − L¯i for all i
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Accordingly, and following Demange's (2018) definition of threat index, we define µ as
the vector of liabilities threat indices such that for every i ∈ N \D, µi = 0 and for i ∈ D,
µi = 1 +
∑
j∈D αijµj ; and we define δ as the vector of credit lines threat indices such that
for every i ∈ N \ G, δi = 0 and for i ∈ G, δi = 1 +
∑
j∈D βijδj . These indices will be
the Lagrange multipliers connected to the second constraint in each problem, which stands
for limited liability. The multipliers capture the sensitivity of the objective function, the
sum of payments, to changes in these constraints. We assume that the cash injection is
small enough that it does not change the state of the bank, that is it does not reduce the
multiplier to 0, and the constraint is still binding. In other words, the sets S,G and D are
unchanged. However, with the increase in cash received which increases the inflows of the
receiver, the limited liability constrained is less binding, and the repayments increase. We
can show that an optimal cash injection that maximises the total payments would be one
that targets the highest threat index among liabilities and credit lines.
Proposition 3.4. An injection of a small amount of cash, that does not change the states
of the banks, is optimal, if it targets the bank with the highest liabilities threat index in case
the objective is to maximise liabilities repayments, and the bank with the highest credit lines
threat index in case the objective is to maximise credit lines payments.
Proof. See Appendix B.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored two channels of contagion of financial risk of default, credit
lines and liabilities. We built on Eisenberg and Noe's model by extending the proof of
existence of a unique payment equilibrium and establishing a fictitious default algorithm.
The introduction of a central clearing counterparty for the network of interbank liabilities
alone, the network of credit lines alone and the networks of liabilities and credit lines
together, was investigated and proved to have important impacts. More work can be
done on this topic, especially regarding the regulations and management of the CCP and
its guarantee funds. Another type of policy intervention that has been motivated here
is targeting policies and cash injection. This can be further investigated in many ways.
In particular, one can explore the optimal strategies for a regulator or a policymaker,




Appendix 3.A Basic Notions
We recall some basic notions and concepts from lattice theory that we use along with other
definitions and theorems.
A lattice is a partially ordered set such that every two elements have a least upper
bound and a greatest lower bound. For any two vectors x and y ∈ Rn such that x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn), the lattice operations are defined as follows:
The meet, or greatest lower bound (infimum) which is the greatest element of Rn lying
below both x and y:
x ∧ y ≡ (min {x1, y1} ,min {x2, y2} , . . . ,min {xn, yn}) .
The join, or least upper bound (supremum) which is the least element of Rn lying above
both x and y:
x ∨ y ≡ (max {x1, y1} ,max {x2, y2} , . . . ,max {xn, yn}) .
We also define the vector x+:
x+ ≡ (max {x1, 0} ,max {x2, 0} , . . . ,max {xn, 0}) .
And ordering any two vectors x and y:
x ≤ y ⇐⇒ xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Tarski's fixed point theorem
Let (L,≤) be any complete lattice. Suppose the map f : L 7→ L is monotone increasing
i.e. ∀x, y ∈ L, x ≤ y =⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y). Then the set of fixed points of f , denoted by
F = {x ∈ L | f(x) = x}, is a complete lattice with respect to ≤. Consequently, f has a
greatest fixed point u¯ and a least fixed point u. Moreover, ∀x ∈ L, x ≤ f(x) =⇒ x ≤
u¯ while f(x) ≤ x =⇒ u ≤ x.
Appendix 3.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Since the payment depends on the inflows fi to i, we must consider the three following
possible cases for fi.




and i defaults. Then fi−L¯i ≤
0 =⇒ (fi − L¯i)+ = max
{
(fi − L¯i) ; 0
}




= fi ≤L¯i ≤ L¯i + C¯i.
Therefore:
pi∗ij = min {αijfi ; Lij + Cij} = αijfi
since αijfi ≤ Lij ≤ Lij + Cij . Thus, i pays only part of the liabilities on a pro rata
basis and i ∈ D.
2. The inflows cover the liabilities but not the credit lines, fi ∈
[
L¯i, L¯i + C¯i
]
. This





fi ≤L¯i + C¯i =⇒ fi − L¯i ≤ C¯i =⇒ βij(fi − L¯i) ≤ Cij , therefore:
pi∗ij = αijL¯i + βij(fi − L¯i) = Lij + βij(fi − L¯i).
In this case, i will pay their total amount of liability and will not default, but will
pay part of their promised credit lines pro rata following the priority of liabilities
over credit lines; i ∈ T .









= L¯i and fi − L¯i ≥ 0. Since fi ≥L¯i + C¯i thus fi − L¯i ≥C¯i
=⇒ βij(fi − L¯i) ≥ Cij . Therefore:
pi∗ij = Lij + Cij .
i will pay the total amount of liabilities and credit lines for every j; i ∈ S.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Take each of the three possible cases of bank i's inflows fi.




Since liabilities are prioritised over credit lines and credit lines over equity, and the
inflows are not enough to pay all the liabilities, then i will default and will pay the
inflows for its debtors pro rata.













2. Distressed: fi ∈
[
L¯i ; L¯i + C¯i
]
Bank i will pay all its liabilities L¯i and then a part of its promised credit lines pro
rata.
a∗i = L¯i and b
∗
i = (fi − L¯i)+ = fi − L¯i > 0.
3. Safe: fi ∈
[
L¯i + C¯i ; ∞
)
This is the trivial case where i will pay all its due amounts:
a∗i = L¯i and b
∗
i = C¯i
since fi ≥L¯i + C¯i.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proofs of Theorem 3.1 and of the following Corollary 3.1 generalise the proofs of
existence and uniqueness of the clearing vector in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) to our setting
that incorporates credit lines.
First, we must prove that the map Φ positive, increasing, concave and non expansive.
Positivity and monotonicity and concavity follow from the fact that the map is a compos-
ition of two maps: the map q → qT + z which is positive, increasing and affine, and the
map q → qT ∧ (L¯+ C¯) which is positive, increasing, and concave .
As for non-expansiveness, we first recall the following definition. A map Φ : Rn → Rn is
l1-non-expansive if ∀x ∈ Rn, ‖ Φ(x)− Φ(y) ‖≤‖ x− y ‖.
Also:
∀x, y, and z, ‖x ∧ z − y ∧ z‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖
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Thus:∥∥Φ(pi)− Φ(pi′)∥∥ = ∥∥(piT + z) ∧ (L¯+ C¯)− (pi′T + z) ∧ (L¯+ C¯)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥piT − pi′T∥∥
Let F (Φ) be the set of fixed points of Φ. Since Φ is increasing, Φ(0) ≥ 0 and Φ(L¯+ C¯) ≤
L¯+ C¯, then by Tarski fixed point theorem F (Φ) is non-empty and has a greatest and least
element. (1) is proved and (1') follows immediately.
(2) can be proved following the same proof proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
Proof of Corollary 3.1
First we define a surplus set S ⊂ N as the set of nodes that have no liability or credit
line to any node outside the set and it has a positive cash flows. Precisely, if SC is the
complement of S,




which is equivalent to




Lemma 3.1. If pi∗ is a clearing vector, then it is not possible for all nodes in a surplus
set to have zero equity value.
Proof. Let S be a surplus set and P+i be the sum of payments received by a node i ∈ S
from nodes outside S such that P+i =
∑
j∈SC piji.
Since S is a surplus set, then nodes in S make no payments to nodes in SC . Next, suppose
that all nodes in S have equity value = 0 then for every i ∈ S it holds that











piji − pii = 0
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Contradiction with the assumption
∑
i∈S zi > 0.
Now define the Risk Orbit of a node as the set of all nodes connected to it through a
directed path whether through liabilities edges or credit lines.
o(i) = {j ∈ N : ∃ a directed path from i to j} = {j ∈ N : Lij > 0 and/or Cij > 0}
Lemma 3.2. Let pi∗be a clearing vector for
(
α, β, L¯, C¯, z
)
and let o(i) be a risk orbit such
that
∑
j∈o(i) zj > 0, then under pi
∗at least one node of o(i) has positive equity value




Proof. We will show that o(i) is a surplus set.
Suppose it is not. Let k ∈ o(i) such that k owed something to j ∈ o(i)C .Take the path
from i to k and add to it the edge from k to j. We get a path from i to j.Thus j ∈ o(i) =⇒
j /∈ o(i)C .
Contradiction. Thus o(i) is a surplus set.
By lemma 3.1, every surplus set contains a node with positive equity.
Define a financial system as regular if every orbit o(i) is a surplus set. Then, if the financial
system is regular, the greatest and the least clearing vectors are the same pi+ = pi−implying
the clearing vector is unique by Theorem 2 proved by Eisenberg and Noe (2001).
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
The financial network in the auxiliary economy with the CCP, is a special case of the
general network before central clearing. Here, the number of links is smaller, such that the
liabilities network is star-shaped with the CCP at the core. Thus, existence and uniqueness
of a payment clearing vector in this economy are proved by Theorem 3.1 and Corollary
3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
First given the assumption that the cash injection keeps the state of banks unchanged,
we can state that the choice of the regulator of the objective function, and problem to
solve will determine a targeted set of banks. In particular, if the regulator maximises the
liabilities payments and solves problem Pa, given that µN\D = µG = µS = 0, the targeted
banks are defaulters. In this case, the result proved by Demange (2018) can be trivially
applied. In case the regulator targets the credit lines payments and solves problem Pb, the
threat indices which represent the impact of an increase or a decrease in payment of a given
bank, are null for defaulters and safe banks. That is because an increase in inflows, that
does not change the state of the receiver, will not change the payment of credit lines by
a defaulter which remains null, nor that by a safe banks which pays in full. The targeted
set are the distressed bank, and the previous result can be extended.
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